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THE MIRAGE OF INDIAN RESERVED WATER RIGHTS AND
WESTERN STREAMFLOW RESTORATION IN THE
MCCARRAN AMENDMENT ERA: A PROMISE UNFULFILLED
BY
MICHAEL C. BLUMM, DAVID H. BECKER,** & JOSHUA D. SMITH***
*

Western state water law has been notorious for its failure to
protect streamflows. One potential means of providing the missing
balance in western water allocation has always been Indian water
rights, which are federal rights “reserved” from state laws. These
federal water rights usually have priority over state-granted rights
because they typically were created in the nineteenth century, well
before most western state water allocation systems were even
established.
Over two decades ago, in 1983, Justice William Brennan assured
Indian tribes that their reserved water rights would not be
compromised by subjecting them to state court adjudications under the
so-called McCarran Amendment, an appropriations rider given
expansive interpretation by the Supreme Court in the 1970s and 1980s.
Justice Brennan’s belief that state courts—comprised largely of elected
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judges—could treat tribal claims evenhandedly, despite the high stakes
and entrenched interests involved in western water rights
adjudications, has never been evaluated.
This study aims to begin to fill that gap by examining the results of
six western water right adjudications—five of which were in state
courts—involving the Klamath, Wind, Yakima, Gila, and Snake rivers,
as well as Pyramid Lake. The results suggest that Justice Brennan’s
optimism was quite misplaced: in none of the cases studied did a court
order restoration of streamflows necessary to fulfill the purpose of the
tribe’s reservation. Instead, in an apparent effort to reduce the
displacement of current water users, the state courts created a number
of new legal principles to limit or diminish tribal water rights.
The Article concludes that, in the McCarran Amendment Era,
tribes must resort to extrajudicial means of restoring streamflows
necessary to fulfill the purposes of their reservations. It shows how
some tribes have employed settlements—and even state law—to
achieve partial streamflow restoration, which is all that now seems
possible in an era in which their claims are usually judged by skeptical
state court judges who face reelections in which entrenched water
users exert considerable influence.
I. INTRODUCTION .............................................................................................1159
II. THE KLAMATH TRIBES’ RESERVED RIGHTS: TIME IMMEMORIAL PRIORITY
AND A THIRTY-YEAR DELAY ..........................................................................1162
A. The Adair Cases: Recognition Without Water .................................1164
B. The Situation Today ...........................................................................1169
III. THE WIND/BIG HORN RIVER LITIGATION: WATER RIGHTS THAT CANNOT
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Just like the desert shows a thirsty man
A green oasis where there’s only sand.
You lured me into something I should have dodged.
The love I saw in you was just a mirage.1

I. INTRODUCTION
Reserved water rights have always been controversial in the West. The
Supreme Court created the doctrine in its famous Winters v. United States 2
decision of 1908, basically to interject some equity into federal-tribal
relations in which Indian reservations were being “pulverized” by Dawes Act
allotments.3 The reserved rights doctrine, which awards water to federal
reservations to fulfill their purposes, has the potential to destabilize western
water rights built around state systems grounded on diversions and temporal
priority because the priority assigned these federal rights is the date of the
reservation, not the date of use.4 And since fulfilling the purposes of federal
reservations often requires maintaining streamflows for wildlife, watershed,
and aesthetic purposes, application of reserved rights offered the prospect
of restoring streamflows depleted by state systems which offer little
effective protection for instream uses.5

1

SMOKEY ROBINSON AND THE MIRACLES, The Love I Saw in You Was Just a Mirage, on MAKE

IT HAPPEN (Motown Records 1967).
2 Winters v. United States, 207

U.S. 564, 577 (1908); see 4 WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS
§ 37.01(b)(2) (Robert E. Beck ed., 2004 repl vol., Matthew Bender & Co. 2003) (1967)
(explaining Winters as holding that the federal government implicitly reserved water rights
when it set aside the Indian reservation, and those rights survived statehood).
3 General Allotment Act of 1887 (Dawes Act), ch. 119, 24 Stat. 388; see 4 WATERS AND
WATER RIGHTS, supra note 2, § 37.02(f)(2) (explaining the overall effect of the Dawes Act and
considering its effect on the allocation of water rights); Judith V. Royster, The Legacy of
Allotment, 27 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1, 9 (1995). President Theodore Roosevelt described the effect of the
Allotment Act as a “mighty pulverizing to break up the tribal [land] mass” in his 1901 message to
Congress. THEODORE ROOSEVELT CYCLOPEDIA 250 (Albert Bushnell Hart & Herbert Ronald
Ferleger eds., Meckler Corp. 1989), available at http://www.theodoreroosevelt.org/TR%20Web
%20Book/TR_CD_to_HTML287.html.
4 See 4 WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS, supra note 2, § 37.01(c)(1). However, over a decade
ago, a study by two respected analysts concluded that while quantification of Indian reserved
rights led to increased tribal water use, existing non-Indian users were generally protected and,
in some cases, their rights were expanded. Reid Peyton Chambers & John E. Echohawk,

Implementing the Winters Doctrine of Indian Reserved Water Rights: Producing Indian Water
and Economic Development Without Injuring Non-Indian Water Users?, 27 GONZ. L. REV. 447,
468 (1991–1992) (citing provisions for new storage, conservation, exchanges, and marketing).
5 See, e.g., Michael C. Blumm, Unconventional Waters: The Quiet Revolution in Federal and
Tribal Minimum Streamflows, 19 ECOLOGY L.Q. 445 (1992) (giving an overly optimistic
assessment). Western states that developed minimum streamflow programs in the latter part of
the 20th century have no effective streamflow protection against earlier diversionary rights,
which continue to dominate western water law under prior appropriation principles as vested
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Although reserved water rights are the product of federal law, due to a
1952 appropriations rider known as the McCarran Amendment,6 federal
reserved water rights are increasingly being interpreted by state courts.
After the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that the McCarran Amendment waived
the federal government’s sovereign immunity defense and gave consent for
the government to be joined in state court suits determining the water rights
of all users within a river basin,7 the Court ruled that reserved rights were
subject to state adjudications.8 The Court then twice ruled that Indian
reserved rights were subject to McCarran Amendment adjudications.9
The policies served by the McCarran Amendment, as Justice Brennan
explained in the Arizona v. San Carlos Apache decision, are to avoid
“duplicative litigation, tension and controversy between the federal and state
forums, hurried and pressured decision making, and confusion over the
disposition of property rights.”10 In dissent, Justice Stevens responded that
federal courts were an appropriate forum for resolving Indian reserved
water rights, and their decisions could then be incorporated into state
decrees.11 Stevens observed that: “States and their citizens may well be more
antagonistic toward Indian reserved rights than other federal reserved
rights, both because the former are potentially greater in quantity and
because they provide few direct or indirect benefits to non-Indian
residents.”12 He cited a congressional promise in the federal courts’
jurisdictional statute that Indian tribes could invoke a neutral federal
forum,13 and also the McCarran Amendment’s silence regarding Indian tribal
claims.14
Whether Justice Brennan’s or Justice Stevens’s view of the
appropriateness of state court adjudications of Indian reserved water rights
has proved more accurate, and whether the resolution of Indian reserved
water rights claims actually produces streamflow restoration, have never
been carefully studied. This Article attempts to fill that void by examining

property rights. For a survey of the obstacles states have erected against recognizing and
implementing reserved rights, see Reed D. Benson, Can’t Get No Satisfaction: Securing Water
for Federal and Tribal Lands in the West, 30 ENVTL. L. REP. 11056, 11057–59 (2000).
6 43 U.S.C. § 666 (2000) (consenting to have the United States joined as a party in state
water rights adjudications). The effect of the McCarran Amendment has been to leave all but a
few reserved rights cases to state courts. Benson, supra note 5, at 11057 (citing JOSEPH L. SAX ET
AL., LEGAL CONTROL OF WATER RESOURCES 833 (2d ed. 1991)).
7 See Dugan v. Rank, 372 U.S. 609, 618 (1963) (holding that 43 U.S.C. § 666 does not waive
sovereign immunity when the state adjudication does not seek to determine the rights of all the
various owners of a given stream).
8 United States v. Dist. Court ex rel. Eagle County, 401 U.S. 520, 523–24 (1971).
9 Colo. River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 809–11 (1976);
Arizona v. San Carlos Apache Tribe, 463 U.S. 545, 564 (1983); see also 4 WATERS AND WATER
RIGHTS, supra note 2, § 37.04(a) (discussing the McCarran Amendment’s effect on federal-state
jurisdiction).
10 San Carlos Apache Tribe, 463 U.S. at 569.
11 Id. at 574.
12 Id. at 575.
13 Id. at 576–77 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1362 (2000)).
14 Id. at 578.
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the assertion of tribal reserved water rights claims in six well-known cases
over the last quarter-century. These cases form the bedrock of modern tribal
reserved rights law in the McCarran Amendment Era. They include
McCarran Amendment adjudications in five different western states, plus
one federal court proceeding, and involve celebrated rivers like the Klamath,
the Big Horn, the Yakima, the Snake, and the Gila, as well as Pyramid Lake.
The Article first explains the case law these adjudications have
produced. Although reserved water rights are the product of federal law,
application of the McCarran Amendment has produced a fractured doctrine,
as state courts make their own interpretations of federal law. This
examination should help clarify the origins and nature of some these
fissures. More importantly, the Article explores the result of the assertion of
reserved tribal rights claims on streamflows in the West. The study reveals
that reserved rights case law in the McCarran Amendment Era has not
produced restored western streamflows. Instead, any streamflow
improvements were more likely the product of settlements or from
negotiations with state water agencies and congressional delegations after
tribal reserved rights received judicial recognition.
In short, by authorizing state courts to interpret federally-reserved
water rights, the McCarran Amendment has forced tribes into hostile forums
in which tribes must be prepared to compromise their claims for
streamflows that fully support the purposes of the reserved rights, perhaps
settling for stream improvements that can partially restore river ecosystems.
Although tribal reserved water rights claims may open the door to
discussions about streamflow restoration, in practice the McCarran
Amendment Era has reduced these claims to mere bargaining chips rather
than vehicles for achieving the purpose of reservations through streamflow
restoration.
This Article proceeds to examine each of the six assertions of reserved
rights, including the history of litigation and its aftermath, focusing
specifically on whether that aftermath has included any improvements in
streamflows. Five of the cases involve McCarran Amendment adjudications
in which state courts have or will determine the scope and sometimes the
existence of reserved water rights: Oregon’s Klamath Basin adjudication,
Wyoming’s Big Horn adjudication, Washington’s Yakima Basin adjudication,
Arizona’s Gila River adjudication, and Idaho’s Snake River adjudication. A
sixth case study, the controversy over Truckee River flows into Pyramid
Lake, did not involve a state McCarran Amendment adjudication, but the
Pyramid Lake Pauite Tribe has successfully employed state law to improve
streamflows in the wake of the Supreme Court’s refusal to recognize the
tribe’s reserved water necessary to sustain its fishery. Several tribes have
successfully pursued post-adjudication settlements, usually aided by
congressional funding.15

15 See infra notes 165–72, 198–208, 287–97, and accompanying text (describing settlements
concerning the Yakima, Gila, and Snake River controversies).
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The Article concludes that in the McCarran Amendment Era, tribal
hopes for a neutral forum to adjudicate their reserved water rights claims
has been largely a mirage. In this era, now dominated by state law and state
courts, tribes must pursue settlements which compromise their water right
claims based on fulfilling the purpose of the reservation, or they must
emulate the dexterity with federal and state law that the Yakama Nation and
Pyramid Lake Tribe have shown following their judicial defeats.
II. THE KLAMATH TRIBES’ RESERVED RIGHTS: TIME IMMEMORIAL PRIORITY AND A
THIRTY-YEAR DELAY
The Klamath River rises in upper Klamath Lake, in south-central
Oregon, at the confluence of the Wood, Williamson, and Sprague rivers, and
winds circuitously through the Cascade Mountains in southwest Oregon and
the Klamath National Forest in northwestern California before emptying into
the Pacific Ocean twenty miles south-southeast of Crescent City.16 The
Klamath Basin encompasses 15,600 acres. The basin is divided between
California and Oregon, with two-thirds located in California. For several
thousand years before the first white settlers ever set foot in the region, the
Klamath Tribes17 hunted, fished, and foraged for subsistence throughout the
Klamath River Basin.18 Historically, the tribes were dependent on the river
and the fish it produced, harvesting thousands of pounds of fish annually.19
In 1864, the Klamath Tribes relinquished their aboriginal title to more
than twenty-two million acres in south-central Oregon and northern
California to the United States in return for a reservation of approximately
1.9 million acres in south-central Oregon, and the “exclusive right” to hunt,
fish, and gather on the reservation.20 Despite some instability in the years
16 Christine Swift, Crisis in the Klamath: New Considerations for Managing Water Under the
Endangered Species Act, 22 TEMP. ENVTL. L. & TECH. J. 65, 70 (2003–2004) (describing the

geography and climate of the Klamath Basin); THE NEW ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE AMERICAN WEST
600 (Howard R. Lamar ed., 1998) [hereinafter NEW WEST ENCYCLOPEDIA].
17 Three separate tribes—the Klamath, Modoc, and Yahooskin—collectively comprise the
Klamath Indians. The Klamath Tribes, Klamath Tribes History, http://www.klamathtribes.org/
history.html (last visited Nov. 12, 2006) [hereinafter History]. There is evidence that Native
Americans have lived in the region for at least 7,000 years. National Park Service, National Wild
and Scenic Rivers System, Klamath River, Oregon, http://www.nps.gov/rivers/wsr-klamathoregon.html (last visited Nov. 12, 2006).
18 See United States v. Adair (Adair II ) , 723 F.2d 1394, 1397 (9th Cir. 1983); The Klamath
Tribes, The Long Struggle Home: The Klamath Tribes’ Fight to Restore Their Land, People and
Economic Self-Sufficiency, http://www.klamathtribes.org/tribal-lands-restoration.htm (last
visited Nov. 12, 2006) [hereinafter The Long Struggle Home] (stating that the Klamath Tribes
continue to retain property rights to hunt, fish, and gather).
19 Ryan Sudbury, When Good Streams Go Dry: United States v. Adair and the Unprincipled
Elimination of a Federal Forum for Treaty Reserved Rights, 25 PUB. LAND & RESOURCES L. REV.
147, 151 (2004).
20 See Treaty with the Klamath, Oct. 14, 1864, 16 Stat. 707 (Article I reserved to the tribe “the
exclusive right of taking fish in the streams and lakes [of the reservation], and of gathering
edible roots, seeds, and berries within its limits.”). The treaty also required the United States to
make annual payments of $8,000 for the first five years, $5,000 for the next five years, and
$3,000 for the next five years, along with a one-time payment of $35,000 for the “use and benefit
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following the treaty concerning the boundaries of the reservation,21 the
Klamath Tribes established several successful economic enterprises,
including freight and cattle companies and a successful sawmill.22 The
Klamath Tribes achieved a measure of social and economic self-sufficiency
which practically no other Indian tribe could match,23 apparently
encouraging Congress to terminate the Klamath reservation in the misguided
1954 Klamath Termination Act.24 In enacting the Klamath Termination Act,
Congress sought to eliminate federal superintendence over the tribes,
dispose their land, and abolish federal services available to them.25 Under
the Act, most were induced to give up their interest in tribal land for a cash

of [the Tribe].” Id. See also Or. Dep’t of Fish & Wildlife v. Klamath Indian Tribe (Oregon DFW),
473 U.S. 753, 755–57 (1985). The U.S. Supreme Court’s opinion in Oregon DFW and the Ninth
Circuit’s opinion in Adair II differed significantly as to the exact acreage ceded by the Klamath
Indians under the 1864 Treaty. See Adair II, 723 F.2d at 1398 (noting the Klamath Tribe
“relinquished its aboriginal claim to some 12 million acres of land in return for a reservation of
approximately 800,000 acres”). This Article uses the U.S. Supreme Court’s figures. See also The
Long Struggle Home, supra note 18 (noting the Klamath Tribes once controlled 22 million acres
in south-central Oregon).
21 For example, the United States forced the Modoc Tribe to occupy the same reservation as
the Klamath, which led to an Indian uprising against the United States. See Holly Doremus & A.
Dan Tarlock, Fish, Farms and the Clash of Cultures in the Klamath Basin, 30 ECOLOGY L.Q. 279,
296 (2003). The Klamath Tribes also disputed the United States’ demarcation of the reservation
boundary. Oregon DFW, 473 U.S. at 755–57. A boundary commission later found that the United
States had erroneously excluded approximately 617,000 acres from the reservation—
approximately one-third of the agreed upon reservation lands. Id. The United States finally
agreed to compensate the tribes for the error in a 1901 agreement. Id. at 758–60. The U.S.
Supreme Court later concluded that this agreement extinguished the tribes’ hunting and fishing
rights on the excluded lands. Id. at 755–74.
22 Sudbury, supra note 19, at 152–53; see also History, supra note 17.
23 Sudbury, supra note 19, at 153. See also The Klamath Tribes, Did You Know?,
http://www.klamathtribes.org/dyk.html (last visited Nov. 12, 2006) (“At the time of termination
in 1954, the Klamath Tribes were the second wealthiest tribe in the nation.”); The Long Struggle
Home, supra note 18 (noting that in 1953, the average income for Klamath tribal members was
just 7% lower than their white counterparts, and that the Klamath were also the only tribes in
the country able to pay their Bureau of Indian Affairs administrative costs).
24 Act of Aug. 13, 1954, ch. 732, 68 Stat. 718 (1954) (codified at 25 U.S.C. §§ 564–564w
(2000)). Prior to 1887, the Klamath Tribes held the reservation in communal ownership. In 1887,
Congress passed the Indian General Allotment Act of (Dawes Act (Indian)), ch. 119, 24 Stat. 388
(1887), under which the government granted parcels of the reservation to individual Indians in
fee. Approximately 25% of reservation lands were converted to individual Indian ownership
under the Dawes Act. Over time, many of the Indian grantees conveyed their allotments on to
non-Indian owners. See Adair II, 723 F.2d at 1398.
25 See Klamath Termination Act, 25 U.S.C. § 564 (2000).
The purpose of this subchapter is to provide for the termination of Federal supervision
over the trust and restricted property of the Klamath Tribe of Indians consisting of the
Klamath and Modoc Tribes and the Yahooskin Band of Snake Indians, and of the
individual members thereof, for the disposition of federally owned property acquired or
withdrawn for the administration of the affairs of said Indians, and for a termination of
Federal services furnished such Indians because of their status as Indians.

Id.; see also Kimball v. Callahan, 590 F.2d 768, 770 (9th Cir. 1979) (describing the Act and its
purposes); Sudbury, supra note 19, at 153–55 (providing a detailed history of the Act and its
purposes).
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payment.26 For those members who opted not to accept the cash payment,
the federal government placed a portion of the otherwise liquated
reservation in a private trust for the remaining tribe members.27 In 1973, the
private trustee sold the land that it was holding in trust for those members
and disbursed the proceeds to those Indians who had refused the initial
payment.28
Although the Klamath Termination Act explicitly preserved the tribes’
water and fishing rights,29 the state of Oregon disputed the significance and
extent of the tribes’ rights, arguing that the rights could be exercised only by
Indians who were members of the Klamath Tribes at the time of the
Termination Act, and that tribal rights did not extend to any lands that had
been disposed under the General Allotment Act of 1887.30 In 1979, in the
second Kimball v. Callahan,31 the Ninth Circuit rejected Oregon’s arguments,
holding that the Termination Act expressly recognized and secured the
tribes’ hunting and fishing rights.32 Moreover, the court held that those rights
extended to the descendants of every member of the tribe.33 The court did
rule, however, that the tribes’ treaty hunting and fishing rights could be
regulated by the state for conservation purposes.34

A. The Adair Cases: Recognition Without Water
The federal government filed suit in 1975 in an effort determine the
water rights of the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, which had succeeded to
the tribes as owner of the Klamath Marsh—now the Klamath National
Wildlife Refuge—within the Williamson River Basin.35 The tribes intervened
to protect their treaty water rights necessary to protect the hunting and
26 Adair II, 723 F.2d at 1398; see also Klamath Termination Act, 25 U.S.C. §§ 564b–564d
(2000) (describing the procedures for distributing, valuing, and purchasing individual Indians’
property rights).
27 Adair II, 723 F.2d at 1398; 25 U.S.C. § 564d(a)(2), (5) (2000).
28 Adair II, 723 F.2d at 1398. The trustee was the U.S. Bank of Oregon. Memorandum from
Carl J. (Bud) Ullman, Dir., Water Adjudication Project for the Klamath Tribes, Chiloquin, Or., to
David Becker (July 13, 2006) [hereinafter “Ullman Memo”].
29 See 25 U.S.C. § 564m(a)–(b) (2000) (“Nothing in this subchapter shall abrogate any water
rights of the tribe and its members . . . . Nothing in this subchapter shall abrogate any fishing
rights or privileges of the tribe or the members thereof enjoyed under Federal treaty.”).
30 Kimball, 590 F.2d 768, 771 (9th Cir. 1979). See also supra note 24 and accompanying text.
31 590 F.2d 768 (9th Cir. 1979). The initial decision in Kimball v. Callahan, 493 F.2d 564, 569
(9th Cir. 1974), ruled that Klamath Indians who withdrew from the tribe under the Klamath
Termination Act retained for themselves and their descendants treaty rights to hunt, trap, and
fish within the ancestral Klamath Indian Reservation.
32 Kimball, 590 F.2d at 775–75.
33 Id. at 776.
34 Id. at 777–78.
35 United States v. Adair (Adair I ) , 478 F. Supp. 336, 339 (D. Or. 1979). For a thorough
examination of the Adair litigation see Sudbury, supra note 19. The Williamson River, a
renowned fly-fishing stream, has a drainage area of 3,000 square miles, supplying one half of the
inflow of upper Klamath Lake. See JOHN C. RISLEY & ANTONIUS LAENAN, U.S. GEOLOGICAL
SURVEY, UPPER KLAMATH BASIN NUTRIENT-LOADING STUDY—ASSESSMENT OF HISTORIC FLOWS IN
THE WILLIAMSON AND SPRAGUE RIVERS 1 (1999).
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fishing rights that the Kimball decision ruled had survived termination.36 The
district court did not issue its first opinion in United States v. Adair (Adair I ) 37
until 1979, about the same time the Ninth Circuit decided Kimball. Adair I
confirmed that the 1864 Treaty guaranteed the tribes an implied right to
water necessary to protect the tribes’ fishing and hunting rights.38 Perhaps
more significantly for water users throughout the Klamath Basin, however,
the court concluded that these impliedly reserved rights had a “time
immemorial” priority date, which survived the termination of the
reservation.39
The state and the non-Indian water users in the Klamath Basin appealed
to the Ninth Circuit, arguing that the district court erred in awarding
reserved water rights to the tribes.40 The state also argued that the district
court should have dismissed the case under the Colorado River abstention
doctrine.41 In United States v. Adair (Adair II ) ,42 the Ninth Circuit rejected
the state’s abstention arguments, concluding that the district court properly
exercised federal jurisdiction.43 The appeals court noted that the district
court carefully limited its ruling to a determination of the priority of
reserved water rights arising under federal law and left the actual
quantification and administration of those rights to the state proceeding.44
36 See supra notes 31–32 and accompanying text. At the time that the federal government
filed the Adair suit, the tribes had been terminated for a quarter-century; consequently, the
government had no trust obligation to protect tribal water rights. The federal concern was
simply to protect the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service’s interest in the Klamath Marsh. Ullman
Memo, supra note 28.
37 Adair I, 478 F. Supp. at 336.
38 Id. at 345.
39 Id. The district court also retained jurisdiction over any issues that might arise relating to
the enforcement of the tribes’ “time immemorial” water right. Id. at 350.
40 Adair II, 723 F.2d 1394, 1399–1400 (9th Cir. 1983).
41 Id. at 1400. The Colorado River abstention doctrine counsels against federal court
jurisdiction over issues traditionally left to state courts when such jurisdiction would result in
duplicative and piecemeal litigation. Colo. River Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S.
800, 819–20 (1976). While the Adair II case was pending, the U.S. Supreme Court decided
Arizona v. San Carlos Apache Tribe of Arizona, 463 U.S. 545 (1983), concluding that federal
courts should avoid exercising jurisdiction over disputes pending in state water rights
adjudications when the exercise of federal jurisdiction would create “the possibility of
duplicative litigation, tension and controversy between the federal and state forums, hurried
and pressured decision making, and confusion over the disposition of property rights.” 463 U.S.
at 569.
At the time the federal government filed suit in Adair I there was no contemporaneous
state proceeding concerning rights of any water users in the Klamath Basin. Adair II, 723 F.2d at
1404–05. Several months after the federal government filed suit in federal court, the state of
Oregon initiated the Klamath Basin Adjudication by issuing notice to some 25,000 water users in
the basin. Id. While Adair I was being litigated, the State filed a motion in the district court to
dismiss the federal lawsuit in favor of the state proceedings under the U.S. Supreme Court’s
abstention doctrine announced in Colorado River and its progeny. Id. at 1399. However, the
district court effectively denied the State’s motion when it issued pretrial orders governing the
federal lawsuit in 1977. Id.
42 723 F.2d 1394 (9th Cir. 1983).
43 Id. at 1407.
44 Id. at 1406. The Ninth Circuit noted that far from intruding in the role of the state court,
the district court limited its ruling to questions involving application of the federal Indian law
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By so doing, the district court’s ruling actually furthered the policy
considerations underlying the McCarran Amendment and the abstention
doctrine—that is, avoiding duplicative and piecemeal adjudication of water
rights and promoting judicial efficiency. 45
On the merits of the case, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s
holding that at the time the Klamath Reservation was established, Congress
intended to reserve water on the reservation “not only for the purpose of
supporting Klamath agriculture, but also for the purpose of maintaining the
Tribe’s treaty right to hunt and fish on reservation lands.”46 Although the
Ninth Circuit upheld the district court’s “time immemorial” priority date, the
court confusingly qualified the Klamath Tribes’ fishing rights, stating that the
treaty entitled the tribes only to “the amount of water necessary to support
its hunting and fishing rights as currently exercised to maintain the
livelihood of Tribe members, not as these rights once were exercised by the
Tribe in 1864.”47 According to the court, the Klamath Tribes’ hunting and
fishing rights “secure[] so much as, but not more than, is necessary to
provide the Indians with a livelihood—that is to say, a moderate living.”48
The court also noted that whatever the scope of the Indian reserved hunting
and fishing right, it did not entitle the tribes to restored wilderness
conditions—what the court called a “wilderness servitude.”49 It would be a
mistake, however, to interpret Adair II as foreclosing restoration of river
flows, since the court’s statement was that the tribes were entitled to “the
amount of water necessary to support its hunting and fishing rights as
currently exercised to maintain the livelihood of Tribe members, not as
these rights once were exercised by the Tribe in 1864. . . . unless, of course,
no lesser level will supply them with a moderate living.”50
Shortly after the federal government filed suit in Adair I, the state of
Oregon initiated the Klamath Basin Adjudication in 1975.51 The state took
virtually no further adjudicative action for nearly fifteen years, however.
Consequently, the state was compelled to reissue notices of intent to
adjudicate to all water users in the basin when it finally decided to proceed
with the adjudication in 1990.52 The state’s 1990 issuance of notices of intent

doctrine of reserved water rights, which allowed each forum to consider those issues most
appropriate to its expertise. Id.
45 Id. at 1406 n.11.
46 Id. at 1410.
47 Id. at 1414–15.
48 Id. at 1415 (citing Washington v. Wash. State Commercial Passenger Fishing Vessel Ass’n,
443 U.S. 658, 686 (1979)).
49 Adair II, 723 F.2d at 1414.
50 Id. at 1414–15 (emphasis added). The court’s language suggested that water flows
necessary to restore tribal fisheries are part of the tribes’ reserved rights if the restored fisheries
are necessary to ensure the tribes’ right to a moderate living. See JUDITH V. ROYSTER & MICHAEL
C. BLUMM, NATIVE AMERICAN NATURAL RESOURCES LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 409 (2002).
51 United States v. Oregon, 44 F.3d 758, 762–65 (9th Cir. 1994). The state adjudication
created a federal abstention issue. See infra note 57; Sudbury, supra note 19, at 162–63.
52 Oregon, 44 F.3d at 762–65.
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prompted the United States to challenge the adequacy of Oregon’s
adjudication of federal reserved water, fishing, and hunting rights.53
In United States v. Oregon,54 the federal government argued that despite
the McCarran Amendment’s waiver of sovereign immunity, Oregon’s
adjudication was insufficiently comprehensive to warrant the application of
the waiver because it excluded groundwater claimants and those with statecertificated rights.55 The federal government also maintained that the
McCarran Amendment waived sovereign immunity as to “suits” in “court”—
not state administrative adjudications.56 The Ninth Circuit rejected these
arguments, holding that tribal reserved water rights could be quantified in
state adjudication, even if that adjudication begins before an administrative
agency and excludes certain classes of water rights holders.57 Despite that
decision, the state has made only glacial progress quantifying Indian
reserved water rights—or any other water rights for that matter—in the
Klamath Basin.
More than twenty years after the district court first recognized the
existence, scope, and priority of Indian water rights in the Klamath Basin,
the federal government and the Klamath Tribes returned to federal court to
ask whether the tribes’ reserved water rights included water to support their
gathering rights, and how the “moderate living” standard announced in Adair
II applied to the quantification of the tribes’ water right.58 In United States v.
Adair (Adair III ),59 Oregon District Court Judge Owen Panner confirmed
that the Klamath Tribes’ reserved water rights included water necessary to
support the tribes’ gathering rights, as well as their hunting, fishing, and
trapping rights, and that the priority date for those rights was time
immemorial.60
The district court then proceeded to address the relationship between
the “moderate living” standard and the quantification of the tribes’ reserved
water rights, flatly rejecting any state quantification of the tribes’ reserved
water rights that failed to reserve enough water to support a “productive
habitat.”61 Noting that the “moderate living” standard qualifies—rather than
replaces—the initial quantification of Indian reserved water rights, the court
outlined a two-step approach to determining its effect on the quantity of the
tribes’ right.62 First, the tribes were entitled to “‘whatever water is necessary
to achieve’ the result of supporting productive habitat.”63 Second, the court

53
54

Id.

44 F.3d 758 (9th Cir. 1994).
Id. at 767–68.
56 Id. at 765–67.
57 Id. at 770–71 (noting that the Oregon courts will eventually review the state agencies
preliminary determinations).
58 United States v. Adair (Adair III ) , 187 F. Supp. 2d 1273, 1274 (D. Or. 2002), vacated,
United States v. Braren, 338 F.3d 971 (9th Cir. 2003).
59 187 F. Supp. 2d 1273 (D. Or. 2002).
60 Id. at 1275.
61 Id. at 1275–76; see ROYSTER & BLUMM, supra note 50, at 409.
62 Adair III, 187 F. Supp. 2d at 1276–77; see ROYSTER & BLUMM, supra note 50, at 409.
63 Adair III, 187 F. Supp. 2d at 1277 (quoting Adair I, 478 F. Supp. 336, 346 (D. Or. 1979)).
55
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concluded that the “moderate living” standard applied only “if tribal needs
may be satisfied by a lesser amount.”64 The court noted that without water
sufficient to fulfill the purposes of the reservation, state water users could
effectively abrogate tribes’ treaty rights to hunt, fish, gather, and trap on
reservation lands—yet only an act of Congress may terminate Indian treaty
rights.65
Finally, the court turned to the parties’ dispute concerning the meaning
of the Ninth Circuit’s “as currently exercised” language in Adair II, which the
state maintained restricted the scope of the tribal right to that amount of
water used in 1979. Judge Panner rejected that argument, concluding that
the “as currently exercised” phrase must be construed to refer “only to the
moderate living standard which recognizes that changing circumstances can
affect the measure of a reserved right.”66 Any other result, he concluded,
would be inconsistent with the fulfillment of the purposes of the
reservation.67
The state and several individual water users appealed to the Ninth
Circuit, arguing that the district court should either have dismissed the case
on ripeness grounds or abstained from exercising its jurisdiction.68 Oregon
claimed that the state agency’s 1999 “Preliminary Evaluation” established no
permanent standard for measuring the tribes’ water rights, since the parties
were free to contest those findings through administrative processes and
eventually before the Oregon courts.69 Because there was no final Klamath
Basin Adjudication determining the scope and extent of the tribes’ reserved
rights, Oregon argued that the case was not yet ripe.70
The Ninth Circuit agreed with the state, holding that further factual
development of the Klamath Basin Adjudication was necessary to determine
what standard of quantification Oregon would actually apply to the tribes’
rights.71 Until the Oregon Water Resources Department (OWRD) embraced
and applied a final standard for determining the tribes’ rights, the state’s
“minimum amount of water necessary” standard was subject to change.
Indeed, there were at least two steps—the administrative hearings and the

64 Adair III, 187 F. Supp. 2d at 1277 (quoting Washington v. Wash. State Commercial
Passenger Fishing Vessel Ass’n, 443 U.S. 658, 685 (1979)). Judge Panner distinguished the U.S.
Supreme Court’s decision in Washington v. Wash. State Commercial Passenger Fishing Vessel
Ass’n (Fishing Vessel), 443 U.S. 658 (1979), from the facts in Adair II. Although the reserved
right in Fishing Vessel could be reduced without completely frustrating the purpose of the
reservation, he concluded that the Klamath Tribes’ reserved water right could not be reduced
without abrogating the reserved rights of the tribes. Adair III, 187 F. Supp. 2d at 1277.
65 Id. at 1275–76.
66 Id. at 1279.
67 Id.
68 United States v. Braren, 338 F.3d 971, 974 (9th Cir. 2003). Oregon argued that the district
court should have abstained under the U.S. Supreme Court’s Colorado River abstention
doctrine. The Ninth Circuit did not reach the abstention issue, instead dismissing the case on
ripeness grounds. Id. at 976.
69 Id. at 974–75.
70 Id.
71 Id. at 975–76.
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final administrative decision—at which that standard could be altered.72
Thus, the state’s preliminary adoption of the “minimum amount of water
necessary” was not a final agency action ripe for review.73
By dismissing the case on ripeness grounds, the Ninth Circuit avoided
ruling on the merits of Judge Panner’s habitat protection ruling.74 More
significantly, however, the decision effectively precluded further federal
court review of any Klamath Tribes’ reserved water rights claims until the
state completes the Klamath Basin Adjudication.75 This is an exceedingly
complex and time-consuming process that started thirty years ago, and is
unlikely to be completed any time soon.
In the Adair decisions, the federal courts confirmed that the Klamath
Tribes have time-immemorial reserved water rights, including instream
flows, to satisfy the purposes—hunting, fishing, trapping, gathering, and
agriculture—for which the tribes and federal government agreed to establish
the Klamath Reservation in 1864.76 However, as a result of the Oregon and
United States v. Braren decisions, the quantification of these water rights is
now left to the state OWRD administrative adjudication.77 Although the
federal courts acknowledged the tribes’ paramount water rights nearly a
quarter-century ago, the state provides no protection for those rights until
the OWRD manages to quantify them in the state adjudication.

B. The Situation Today
Following unsuccessful efforts in the late 1990s and early 2000s to resolve
Klamath water rights claims through an alternative dispute resolution process,78
OWRD broke the tribal water rights claims into eight separate cases that
corresponded to the different subbasins of the Klamath River, including
Klamath Lake and Klamath Marsh.79 In late 2005 and early 2006, the tribes, the
federal government, and other parties briefed the issues in these cases for the
state’s Office of Administrative Hearings of OWRD.80 This agency scheduled
hearings for 2007, with the goal of issuing a decree by the end of that year.81
Although the state announced that the 1999 “preliminary evaluation” standards
72
73
74

Id.
Id.

Sudbury, supra note 19, at 170.
Id. at 171.
76 See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
77 See supra notes 51–57 (Oregon), 68–75 (Braren) and accompanying text.
78 See Stephen E. Snyder, Klamath Water Crisis, in NEGOTIATING TRIBAL WATER RIGHTS 148–
49 (Bonnie G. Colby et al. eds., 2005) (examining the Klamath water crisis and the reasons
alternative dispute resolution efforts between stakeholders were unsuccessful).
79 These subbasins included the Williamson, Sycam, Wood, and Sprague Rivers as well as
the mainstem Klamath. Telephone Interview by David Becker with Carl J. (Bud) Ullman, Dir.,
Water Adjudication Project for the Klamath Tribes, Chiloquin, Or. (Mar. 14, 2006) [hereinafter
Interview with Bud Ullman].
80 Id.; see, e.g., United States and Klamath Tribes’ Joint Motion for Ruling on Legal Issues
Defining the Tribal Water Rights, Barrett v. U.S. Bureau of Indian Affairs, No. 281 (Office of
Admin. Hearings, Or. Water Res. Dep’t July 8, 2005).
81 Interview with Bud Ullman, supra note 79.
75
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at issue in Braren will be given no weight in the forthcoming adjudication,82 it is
hardly clear just what standards, beyond those articulated in the Adair cases,
ODWR will apply in quantifying the tribes’ reserved instream rights.
Over a quarter-century after the court in Adair I recognized the Klamath
Tribes’ reserved instream flow rights, the Klamath tribes continue to await the
outcome of the state comprehensive adjudication process in order to obtain
river water to which their treaty entitles them. Although the litigation that the
tribes undertook to obtain recognition of their reserved water rights was a
critical first step on the road to obtaining “wet rights” to instream flows, it is
quite evident that that was only the first step in a process which has yet to come
to full fruition. And partly because the tribes’ water rights claims have
languished in the state administrative process, Klamath River salmon runs
reached critically low levels, requiring the closure of the off-shore salmon
harvesting along the Oregon and northern California coasts in 2006.83 Litigation
and negotiations continue over the relicensing or removal of four dams licensed
to PacifiCorp, currently blocking treaty-reserved fish from passing up the
Klamath River into Oregon.84 The scope of the Klamath Tribes’ reserved water
rights might be resolved as part of a settlement focusing on fish survival and
dam removal,85 making the state administrative water rights adjudication moot.
82 Id. In its brief in Braren, the state expressly disclaimed that the preliminary evaluation
standard had any legal significance, urging the federal courts not to intervene to review that
standard. See Brief of Defendant-Intervenor-Appellant State of Oregon at 20, United States v.
Braren, 338 F.3d 971 (9th Cir. 2003) (Nos. 02-35441, 02-35446).

The preliminary evaluation does not in any way control the hearing officer’s decisions or
preclude the hearing officer from coming to a conclusion different from the preliminary
evaluation after hearing all the arguments and evidence. The preliminary evaluation does
not control the Department’s final determination. And the preliminary evaluation does
not control the exceptions that may be filed in the circuit court, or the circuit court’s
decree. It does not represent a decision by the state.

Id.
83 See Peter Sleeth, Short Season to Start June Fourth for Chinook, THE OREGONIAN, Apr. 29,
2006, at C01 (reporting the federal government’s final decision to limit commercial fishing of
salmon but to maintain close to normal levels of recreational fishing); see also Peter Sleeth &
Michael Milstein, Feds Call for Halt this Season of Salmon Fisheries off Coast, THE OREGONIAN,
Mar. 8, 2006, at A1 (reporting that Federal fish managers had called for a moratorium on
commercial and sport fishing of salmon in California and Oregon).
84 In March 2006, the U.S. Fish & Wildlife Service and National Marine Fisheries Service
recommended that the dams’ owner, PacifiCorp, install fish ladders and turbine screens at four
of the dams as a condition of relicensing. Jeff Barnard, Power Firm Would Rather Truck Fish
than Build Ladders, THE COLUMBIAN (Vancouver, Wash.), Apr. 29, 2006, at C7.
85 The Federal Power Act’s provisions that require protection of the purposes of federal
reservations and the installation of fishways, Federal Power Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 803(e), 811 (2000),
as well as the Clean Water Act’s requirement that federal licensees comply with state water
quality standards, Federal Water Pollution Control Act, 33 U.S.C § 1341(a) (2000), may
encourage licensees to agree to remove dams rather than incur costly renovations. See Michael
C. Blumm & Viki A. Nadol, The Decline of the Hydropower Czar and the Rise of Agency
Pluralism in Hydroelectric Licensing, 26 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L 81 (2001) (discussing the decline of
the FERC’s authority). For an examination of the effects of the 2005 amendments to the FPA,
see David H. Becker, The Challenges of Dam Removal: The History and Lessons of the Condit
Dam and Potential Threats From the 2005 Federal Power Act Amendments, 36 ENVTL. L. 811,
854–62 (2006).
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III. THE WIND/BIG HORN RIVER LITIGATION: WATER RIGHTS THAT CANNOT BE
USED
The Wind/Big Horn River system originates in several creeks along the
north side of the Wind River Mountains Range in west-central Wyoming. The
Wind flows about 200 miles southeasterly across the Shoshone Basin and
through the Wind River Indian Reservation, then northward, through a gap in
the Owl Creek Mountains where, after flowing out of Boysen Reservoir, its
name becomes the Big Horn River, a tributary of the Yellowstone River.86
The 1868 Second Treaty of Fort Bridger established the Wind River Indian
Reservation for the Eastern Shoshone Tribe.87 Ten years later, the federal
government moved the Northern Arapaho onto the reservation.88 The
reservation was subsequently diminished in a series of agreements the
federal government negotiated with the tribes.89 By the turn of the twentieth
century, the tribes—once nomadic buffalo hunters—were failed agrarians,
dependant on the federal government for food, shelter, and clothing.90
Meanwhile, settlers inhabited the tribes’ ceded lands under public land
disposal statutes. They first settled lands along the river that could be easily
irrigated in the semi-arid climate. Gradually, they expanded into the upper
basin, where irrigation projects (both private and government-funded) were
necessary to sustain agriculture.91 There is consequently considerable nonIndian irrigation on both ceded lands and the reservation itself.92

A. The Big Horn Adjudication
In January 1977, the Wyoming legislature, responding to the Supreme
Court’s 1976 decision subjecting tribal reserved rights to McCarran

86 See Geology.com, Wyoming Rivers Map, http://geology.com/state-map/maps/wyomingrivers-map.gif (last visited Nov. 12, 2006); see also Wikipedia, Wind River (Wyoming),
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wind_River_(Wyoming) (last visited Nov. 12, 2006); Wikipedia,
Bighorn River, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bighorn_River (last visited Nov. 12, 2006).
87 See Treaty with the Shoshonees and Bannacks, July 3, 1868, 15 Stat. 673 (setting aside 2.8
million acres for the reservation). A treaty concluded just five years earlier had set aside over 44
million acres. See Treaty between the United States of America and the Eastern Bands of
Shoshonee Indians, July 2, 1863, 18 Stat. 685.
88 See In re General Adjudication of all Rights to Use Water in the Big Horn River System
(Big Horn I ) , 753 P.2d 76, 83 (Wyo. 1989).
89 In the First McLaughlin Agreement in 1897, the tribes sold the Big Horn Hot Springs. In
the Second McLaughlin Agreement of 1904–1905, the tribes ceded an additional 1.48 million
acres. Id. at 84.
90 Id. at 83–84.
91 See id. at 84 (discussing the geography and history of the reservation). Today, the area
produces mostly spring grains, alfalfa, other hay, and sugar beets. BRS, INC. ET AL.,
WIND/BIGHORN RIVER BASIN PLAN FINAL REPORT 14 tbl.2.2-4 (2003), available at http://waterplan.
state.wy.us/plan/bighorn/finalrept/final_report.pdf.
92 In 1934, the federal government reserved all ceded lands that had not been settled and
subsequently restored some of these undisposed lands to the tribes. The government also
purchased some lands from settlers and conveyed those to the tribes. Since 1953, the amount of
Indian lands on-reservation has been fairly stable. See id. at 84.
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Amendment procedures,93 authorized system-wide state adjudications for
water rights, including federal water rights.94 Two days later, the state filed
suit in Wyoming district court concerning the Big Horn River Basin,
including among the defendants the federal government as trustee for the
tribes.95 In what became the first state court quantification of Indian
reserved rights, the district court appointed a special master who, after four
years of proceedings, issued a 1982 report recommending that the court find
that the purpose of the Wind River reservation was to establish a permanent
homeland for the tribes and recognize a reserved water right for the tribes to
fulfill that purpose. The master quantified reserved rights for irrigation,
stock watering, fisheries, wildlife, aesthetics, as well as for domestic,
commercial, industrial, and municipal uses.96
In its 1983 decision, the district court declined to adopt the master’s
recommendations, refusing to recognize reserved rights for non-agricultural
purposes. However, the court did approve the part of the master’s report
that quantified reserved irrigation rights based on the number of practicably
irrigable acres within the reservation.97 The court concluded that the
purpose of the Wind River reservation, as evident from the text of the
Second Treaty of Fort Bridger, was “purely agricultural.”98 The state, the
tribes, and numerous other parties appealed to the Wyoming Supreme Court.
Six years after the district court decision, a fractured Wyoming
Supreme Court affirmed the district court.99 Concerning the reservation’s
purpose, the court acknowledged the canon of treaty construction that calls
for construing treaties generously in favor of the tribes but emphasized the
treaty language referring to “said agricultural reservations.”100 This phrase,
along with other treaty provisions authorizing agricultural allotments,
providing seeds and farm implements, and promising stipends and bonuses
for farming, convinced the court that the sole purpose of the reservation was
agricultural.101 The court was not persuaded by the tribes’ clear intention of
continuing to hunt and fish on the reservation or by post-treaty agreements
and Indian agent reports describing the continuation of such non-agrarian
pursuits.102
In terms of instream flows, the most important tribal claims were for
fisheries and for wildlife and aesthetics. The Wyoming Supreme Court

93 See generally Colo. River Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 819–20 (1976)
(holding that the McCarran Amendment’s “consent jurisdiction . . . bespeaks a policy that
recognizes the availability of comprehensive state systems for adjudication of water rights ”).
94 WYO. STAT. ANN. § 1-1054.1 (1977) (current version at WYO. STAT. ANN. § 1-37-106) (2000)).
95 Big Horn I, 753 P.2d at 84.
96 Id. at 85.
97 Id. at 86.
98 Id. at 95.
99 Id. at 83.
100 Id. at 96–97. The court stated that “we cannot remake history,” quoting Rosebud Sioux
Tribe v. Kneip, 430 U.S. 584, 615 (1977), and observed that “courts should not distort the words
of a treaty to find rights inconsistent with its language.” Big Horn I, 753 P.2d at 97.
101 Id. at 97 (citing Articles 6, 7, 8, 9, and 12 of the treaty).
102 Id. at 98.

GAL.BLUMM.DOC

2006]

11/15/2006 10:20:52 PM

A PROMISE UNFULFILLED

1173

recognized that other courts had recognized reserved water rights for
fisheries, but the court noted that those were due to express treaty
provisions or situations where tribes “were heavily, if not totally, dependent
on fish for their livelihood.”103 The court faulted the special master for
thinking that a reserved right for fishing could be implied where a tribe was
only “partially dependent upon fishing,” noting that the district court
determined that the Wind River tribes had “neither a dependency upon
fishing nor a traditional lifestyle involving fishing.”104 Absent an express
treaty provision or an historic heavy dependence on fishing, the court would
imply no reserved right for fish.105
As for wildlife and aesthetics, for which the master had awarded sixty
percent of historic flows, the district court found insufficient evidence
justifying reserved rights for these purposes.106 The Wyoming Supreme Court
affirmed the district court’s conclusion that the reservation’s purpose was
exclusively agricultural, observing that no other purpose was mentioned in
the treaty language, and determining that the tribes and the federal
government failed to introduce sufficient evidence of “a tradition of wildlife
and aesthetic preservation” to justify an implied reserved water right.107
Although the court’s rulings on instream issues were adverse to the
tribes, and the court also rejected the tribes’ claim for reserved
groundwater,108 the decision did produce a substantial award for tribal
irrigation. Using the “practicably irrigable acreage” test to measure the scope
of the reserved irrigation right,109 the court affirmed a quantification of over
500,000 acre-feet of water.110 When the U.S. Supreme Court affirmed,
dividing evenly on the issue of applying the practicably irrigable acreage test

103 Id. (citing Adair II, 723 F.2d 1394, 1409 (9th Cir. 1983) and Colville Confederated Tribes v.
Walton, 647 F.2d 42, 48 (9th Cir. 1981)).
104
105
106
107
108

Id.
Id.
Id. at 99.
Id.
Id. at 100. The court noted that “the logic which supports a reservation of surface water

to fulfill the purpose of the reservation also supports reservation of groundwater,” but could
find no cases awarding reserved rights to groundwater, noting that the Supreme Court’s
decision in United States v. Cappaert, 426 U.S. 128, 143 (1976), concerned a surface water pool
(although it resulted in an injunction against groundwater pumping). Big Horn I, 753 P.2d at 99.
Justice Burger’s opinion for the Cappaert Court found that the water in the national monument
at issue was surface water, even though the water in the pool was some 50 feet below the
opening of the cavern. Cappaert, 426 U.S. at 131, 142.
The Arizona Supreme Court subsequently rejected the Wyoming court’s unwillingness to
find reserved rights in groundwater. In re Gila River System and Source, 989 P.2d 739, 749–50
(Ariz. 1999). See infra note 191 and accompanying text; see also 4 WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS,
supra note 2, § 37.02(d), at ch. 37, 44 n.284 (collecting other cases indicating that groundwater
may be the subject of reserved rights).
109 See 4 WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS, supra note 2, § 37.02(e), at 37–46 (discussing cases
concerning changing on-reservation water use).
110 See A. DAN TARLOCK ET AL., WATER RESOURCE MANAGEMENT: A CASEBOOK IN LAW AND
PUBLIC POLICY 895 (5th ed. 2002) (noting that certiorari was granted solely on the state’s
contention the state court should have employed the practically irrigable acreage test).
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after Justice O’Connor recused herself,111 the tribes were left with a
substantial amount of water for an agricultural purpose that they did not
wish to pursue.112
In order to use part of its decreed reserved rights for instream
purposes, the tribes proceeded to adopt the Wind River Interim Water Code
and establish the Wind River Water Resources Control Board, which in turn
issued an instream flow permit for 252 cubic feet per second (cfs) of Wind
River flows for “fisheries restoration and enhancement, recreational uses,
groundwater recharge, and downstream benefits to irrigators and other
water users.”113 But when the tribes subsequently complained to the state
engineer that upstream diverters were depleting Wind River flows below the
level called for in the tribal permit, the engineer refused to take action
against the diverters, claiming that the tribes’ right was only to divert water,
not preserve streamflows.114
The tribes sued, and the Wyoming district court appointed another
special master, who issued another report favoring the tribes. This time the
district court agreed with the master, declaring that the tribes could use
their federal reserved rights as they wished, regardless of Wyoming state
law, and appointing the tribal water agency as the administrator of all onreservation water rights.115 But a deeply divided Wyoming Supreme Court
reversed.
The court produced five different opinions from its five justices.116 A
majority ruled that the tribes could not change the use of their reserved
rights to future water117 from irrigation to instream, but the reasoning was
hardly clear. Two justices concluded that the change was impermissible
because it was inconsistent with state law, which restricted instream flows

111 Justice O’Connor recused herself due to her family’s participation in the Gila River
Adjudication in Arizona. An opinion she apparently drafted for the Court would have modified
the practicably irrigable acreage standard with a “sensitivity doctrine” that would help protect
junior non-Indian water rights. See Andrew C. Mergen & Sylvia F. Liu, A Misplaced Sensitivity:
The Draft Opinions in Wyoming v. United States, 68 U. COLO. L. REV. 683, 684–685 (1997).
112 The dissenting justices in the Wyoming Supreme Court thought that limiting the tribes’
reserved rights to agriculture “assumes that the Indian peoples will not enjoy the same style of
evolution as other people, nor are they to have the benefits of modern civilization.” Big Horn I,
753 P.2d at 119 (Thomas, J., dissenting). Justice Thomas thought that the homeland purpose
“assumes that the homeland will not be a static place frozen in an instant of time but . . . will
evolve and will be used in different ways that the Indian society develops.” Id.
113 See DAVID GETCHES ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 832 (4th ed.
1998) (noting that the flows would come from the part of the tribes’ reserved rights awarded for
future projects; thus, it was water that could not be presently used by the tribes); TARLOCK,
supra note 110, at 896.
114 GETCHES, supra note 113, at 832–33.
115 TARLOCK, supra note 110, at 896.
116 The five opinions made it so confusing as to what the court actually held that one justice
felt compelled to supply “a guide to the court’s present opinion” in order to provide some
clarity. In re General Adjudication of All Rights to Use Water in the Big Horn River System (Big
Horn II ) , 835 P.2d 273, 300–01 (Wyo. 1992) (Golden, J., dissenting).
117 “Future water” refers to that part of reserved water rights not currently in use by the
tribes.
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to state ownership.118 Another thought that state law did not govern, but that
the federal treaty prohibited instream use.119 Both interpretations ignored
U.S. Supreme Court precedent upholding the right to transfer irrigation
water to other uses.120 The court also overruled the district court concerning
the tribal water agency administering on-reservation water rights,
concluding—again on a three to two vote—that only the state engineer
possessed authority to administer water rights.121

B. The Situation Today
The Wyoming Supreme Court decisions frustrated the Shoshone and
Arapaho Tribes’ efforts to secure instream flows in the Wind River. Tribal
efforts to develop water for irrigation on the Wind River Reservation, and to
seek alternative means of securing instream flows, have been in limbo for
the past fifteen years, in part due to lack of funding for water projects on the
reservation.122 However, the tribes continue to negotiate with the state and
federal governments over the use of their reserved water rights, including
the possibility of exchanging a portion of their water rights for funding of onreservation water projects.123 Although the Wyoming Supreme Court

118 Big Horn II, 835 P.2d at 279–80 (majority opinion), 284 (Thomas, J., concurring).
According to the leading treatise on federal Indian law, the notion that state law may limit the
uses to which reserved water rights may be put “runs counter to the principle that tribal
reserved rights are governed by federal law.” COHEN’S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 1190
(Nell J. Newton et al. eds., LexisNexis Matthew Bender 2005) (1941).
119 Big Horn II, 835 P.2d at 286–287 (Cardine, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part). Judge
Cardine also suggested that the tribes were free to change the use of their existing water to
instream purposes. Id. at 285.
120 Arizona v. California, 439 U.S. 419, 422 (1979) (noting that water awarded under the
practicably irrigable acreage (PIA) standard could be used for non-agricultural purposes, stating
that while PIA “shall constitute the means of determining quantity of adjudicated water rights
[it] shall not constitute a restriction of the usage of them to irrigation or other agricultural
application”).
121 Big Horn II, 835 P.2d at 283 (majority opinion) (construing the Wyoming Constitution).
The commentary was quite critical. See, e.g., Peggy Sue Kirk, Cowboys, Indians and Reserved
Water Rights: May A State Court Limit How Indian Tribes Use Their Water?, 28 LAND & WATER L.
REV. 467, 487 (1993) (concluding that the decision “strengthens the argument that state courts
are not a fair forum for the adjudication of Indian reserved water rights.”); Berrie Martinis,
From Quantification to Qualification: A State Court’s Distortion of the Law in In re General
Adjudication of All Rights to use Water in the Big Horn River System, 68 WASH. L. REV. 435, 454
(1993) (concluding that the decision “is a step on the road to extinction of tribal sovereignty”).
122 Telephone Interview by David Becker with Wes Martel, Former Tribal Councilman,
Eastern Shoshone Tribe of the Wild River Reservation, in Ft. Washakie, Wyo. (Mar. 21, 2006)
[hereinafter Interview with Wes Martel]; see also Ramsey Kropf, Wind River Litigation, in
NEGOTIATING TRIBAL WATER RIGHTS, supra note 78, at 111–12 (describing ongoing litigation and
settlement efforts); Daniel Kraker, The New Water Czars, HIGH COUNTRY NEWS, Mar. 15, 2004, at
7, 11, available at http://www.hcn.org/servlets/hcn.Article?article_id=14616 (noting that the
Wind River Reservation Tribes won extensive water rights but had “absolutely no money to
develop those resources.”).
123 Interview with Wes Martel, supra note 122; see also Wyoming State Water Plan,
Wind/Bighorn/Clarks Fork Rivers, http://waterplan.state.wy.us/basins/bighorn/issues.html (last
visited Nov. 12, 2006) (describing ongoing discussions between the State and Tribes over the
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decisions stopped the tribes from transferring their water to instream use, it
is possible that the tribes may be able to persuade the state to obtain and
hold instream rights in exchange for allowing more water storage on the
Wind River Reservation.124 Additional water storage is an important goal for
the state, and the reservation is the only feasible location for building new
storage in the Wind River Basin.125
In addition to their continuing efforts to secure additional instream
flows and water development opportunities based on the tribes’ decreed
reserved water rights, the tribes have worked with the United States
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) on civil and criminal enforcement
of the Clean Water Act in order to preserve the water quality in the Wind
River and to improve water delivery on the reservation. In 2001, EPA
ordered a cattle company to restore a section of the Wind River it had
degraded by releasing some 4,000 cubic yards of streambed sediment into
the river.126 Four years later, three businesses agreed to settle EPA claims
for polluting within the boundaries of the Wind River Reservation in
violation of the Clean Water Act, Safe Drinking Water Act, and Oil Pollution
Act by paying $1.327 million in penalties.127 The violations included
underground injection and surface discharges which contaminated tribal
drinking water.128 The penalties included some $700,000 for so-called
“supplemental environmental projects” on the reservation, including the
purchase and installation of piping and other equipment to upgrade water
treatment facilities and provide better quality and quantity of drinking water
to tribal members.129 And, in 2006, with the tribes participating as amicus in
the appeal, the Tenth Circuit upheld the conviction of an irrigation district
manager for building earthen dikes in the Wind River adjacent to the
reservation in violation of the Clean Water Act.130 Although these regulatory
enforcement efforts have not put water back in the river, they have helped
improve the quality of the water that is there and will allow the tribes to
develop projects that may reduce water waste on the reservation, potentially
enhancing streamflows.131

administration of reserved rights and the development of the Tribes’ “futures” award).
124 See Kropf, supra note 122, at 112; Interview with Wes Martel, supra note 122.
125 Interview with Wes Martel, supra note 122.
126 Press Release, U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency Region 8, Developers Ordered to Restore Wind
River (Oct. 5, 2001), available at http://yosemite.epa.gov/r8/r8media.nsf (follow “2001” hyperlink
under “Archives”; then follow “10/05/2001: Developers ordered to restore Wind River”
hyperlink).
127 Oil Firms Pay $1.32 Million for Fouling Wind River Reservation Water, ENV’T NEWS
SERVICE, June 8, 2005, available at http://www.ens-newswire.com/ens/jun2005/2005-06-08-09.asp
#anchor3.
128
129
130

See id.
See id.

United States v. Hubenka, 438 F.3d 1026, 1035 (10th Cir. 2006).
See BRS ENG’G, TECHNICAL MEMORANDUM, WIND/BIGHORN BASIN PLAN: SOCIOECONOMIC
FACTORS AND WATER DEMAND 20 (2003), available at http://waterplan.state.wy.us/plan/bighorn/
techmemos/socio.pdf (“Much of the water allocated for current use is not actually used but lost
on the Reservation, due to leakage resulting from the poor condition of water distribution and
conveyance infrastructure in many areas.”).
131
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IV. THE YAKAMA EFFORT TO RESTORE A SALMON STREAM: “TIME-IMMEMORIAL”
BUT “DIMINISHED” RESERVED RIGHTS
The headwaters of the Yakima River are in the Cascade Mountain
Range in central Washington. The Yakima, which flows some 214 miles
southeasterly until it joins the Columbia River near Tri-Cities, Washington,
was once home to the largest salmon runs in the upper Columbia Basin,132
but has been subject to heavy irrigation since the late nineteenth century.
Largely as a result of dam building and irrigation diversions, Yakima Basin
salmon declined from nearly 1,000,000 returning adults to fewer than 5,000
by the mid-1990s,133 and its coho (Oncorhynchus kisutch), sockeye
(Oncorhynchus nerka), and summer chinook (Oncorhynchus tshawytscha)
runs went extinct.134
The decline of Yakima Basin salmon has been especially difficult for the
Yakama Indian Nation, which has been dependent on salmon fishing for
subsistence, commerce, and culture for centuries.135 The Yakama

One potential avenue the tribes might consider, with EPA cooperation, would be to
pursue “treatment as a State” (TAS) status under the Clean Water Act (CWA). 33 U.S.C.
§ 1377(e) (2000). If the tribes included in an EPA-approved program flow parameters as part of
their water quality standards and required all non-point sources of pollution, such as irrigation
diversions, to certify that they were meeting water quality standards, the tribes could perhaps
produce substantial instream flow improvements through regulatory means. Under the CWA,
state and tribal programs may be stricter than federal requirements. Id. § 1370; City of
Albuquerque v. Browner, 97 F.3d 415, 423 (10th Cir. 1996) (“We conclude that the EPA’s
construction of the 1987 amendment to the Clean Water Act—that tribes may establish water
quality standards that are more stringent than those imposed by the federal government—is
permissible because it is in accord with powers inherent in Indian tribal sovereignty.”).
132 See YAKIMA SUBBASIN FISH & WILDLIFE PLANNING BD.Y YAKIMA SUBBASIN PLAN 2004 1-34
(2004), available at http://www.nwcouncil.org/fw/subbasinplanning/yakima/plan/1_Overview.
pdf (stating that historically 500,000–900,000 salmon returned to the Yakima Subbasin annually,
while current numbers are greatly reduced, and summer chinook, sockeye, and native coho are
extinct in the subbasin).
133 Nw. Power Planning Council, Notes to Committee Members (Apr. 2, 1998), available at
http://www.nwcouncil.org/fw/artprod/apc/1998_04/notes.htm. See generally Northwest Power
Planning Council, 1998 Council Briefing Book, available at http://www.nwcouncil.org/library/
1998/98-10.htm (stating that salmon and steelhead populations have “been reduced to historic
lows,” and noting that while irrigation has substantially reduced streamflows, much of the
basin’s habitat remains intact, making it one of the best areas in the Columbia Basin for salmon
restoration); YAKIMA SUBBASIN FISH AND WILDLIFE PLANNING BOARD, NORTHWEST POWER
PLANNING COUNCIL, YAKIMA SUBBASIN PLAN (2004), available at http://www.nwcouncil.org/
fw/subbasinplanning/yakima/plan/0_ExecSumm.pdf (describing how Yakima Basin salmon
populations have been “dramatically reduced”).
134 See Legacy of Loss: A Partial List of Extinction of Salmon and Steelhead Populations,
http://www.inforain.org/mapsatwork/salmonstocks/salmonstocks_appendix2.htm (last visited
Nov. 12, 2006) (coho, summer chinook); MICHAEL C. BLUMM, SACRIFICING THE SALMON: A LEGAL
AND POLICY HISTORY OF THE DECLINE OF COLUMBIA BASIN SALMON 50–51 (2002) [hereinafter
SACRIFICING THE SALMON] (sockeye).
135 See NW. POWER PLANNING COUNCIL, U.S. TRIBES AND TRIBAL ORGANIZATIONS 62 (2004),
http://www.nwcouncil.org/library/2000/2000-11.pdf (last visited Nov. 12, 2006) (noting that due
to the decline in salmon populations, “the Yakama Indian Nation has lost a major source of its
physical, spiritual, cultural and economic wellbeing”).
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Reservation, established by treaty in 1855,136 was established in part to allow
the tribe to continue their historic fishing practices. The treaty expressly
promised the tribe the exclusive right to take fish on-reservation and also
“the right of taking fish at all usual and accustomed places, in common with
the citizens of the Territory,” off of the reservation.137 The Yakama joined in
litigation filed in 1970, seeking, among other things, to have a federal court
declare that the express treaty “right of taking fish” supplied protection of
salmon habitat from degrading activities like irrigation diversions. The
district court deferred on that issue but ruled that the treaty entitled the
tribes the right to half of the salmon harvests,138 which the Supreme Court
affirmed in 1979.139

A. The Acquavella Adjudication
After the Supreme Court decision, the Yakama renewed their habitat
protection claim, maintaining that the operation of a Yakima Basin dam was
threatening to dewater salmon redds (nests). In the fall of 1980, the district
court ordered that sufficient water be left in the Yakima River to protect the
threatened redds,140 a result the Ninth Circuit eventually affirmed in 1985.141
Neither this case nor the Supreme Court’s 1979 decision dealt directly with
the tribes’ reserved water rights, however, as those were already at issue in a
McCarran Amendment adjudication of all rights in the Yakima Basin, known
as the Acquavella adjudication, which the state filed in 1977.142 In 1989, after
136

Treaty with the Yakamas, June 9, 1855, 12 Stat. 951, 952 (ratified in 1859).
Id. art. III; see SACRIFICING THE SALMON, supra note 134, at 53–67 (describing the
negotiations leading to the signing of “Stevens treaties” like the Yakama Treaty).
138 United States v. Washington, 384 F. Supp. 312, 343 (W.D. Wash. 1974), aff’d, 520 F.2d 676
(9th Cir. 1975).
139 Fishing Vessel, 443 U.S. 658 (1979).
140 Kittitas Reclamation Dist. v. Sunnyside Valley Irrigation Dist., 763 F.2d 1032, 1033–34 (9th
Cir. 1985) (describing the district court’s order of the release of water stored behind the Cle
Elum Dam in order to protect salmon redds).
141 Id. at 1035. The Ninth Circuit issued three different opinions in the case, becoming
progressively less clear about the nature of the treaty in response to the en banc Ninth Circuit’s
decision in Phase II of United States v. Washington, 759 F.2d 1353, 1357 (9th Cir. 1985) (vacating
a district court decision that had concluded that the treaty “right of taking fish” included the
right to protect the habitat necessary to maintain fishing because granting declaratory relief
without concrete facts would be judicially imprudent, possibly producing results that could be
“imprecise in definition and uncertain in dimension”). See SACRIFICING THE SALMON, supra note
134, at 251–52, 255–56 (discussing the three different Ninth Circuit opinions, in which the court
took an increasingly vague stance on the Tribe’s fishing rights).
142 See Wash. Dep’t of Ecology v. Yakima Reservation Irrigation Dist. (Acquavella II ) , 850
P.2d 1306, 1309 (Wash. 1993) (noting that the state began the adjudication in October 1977). The
Yakama’s upstream neighbor, the Confederated Tribes of the Colville Reservation, obtained
judicial recognition of their instream water rights in the early 1980s. See Colville Confederated
Tribes v. Walton (Colville I ) , 647 F.2d 42 (9th Cir. 1981) (holding that the tribe possessed
reserved water sufficient to establish a tribal fishery with Lahonton cutthroat trout to replace
its historic salmon fishery, lost due to construction of impassable federal dams); Colville
Confederated Tribes v. Walton (Colville II ) , 752 F.2d 397 (9th Cir. 1985) (quantifying those
reserved rights and indicating that reserved water for irrigation had a reservation priority date);
see also Joint Bd. of Control of Flathead, Mission, and Jocko Irrigation Dists. v. United States,
137
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considerable procedural wrangling,143 the district court quantified the
Yakama Nation’s reserved rights for irrigation and ruled that while the tribe
had reserved water for fish with a priority date of “time immemorial,”144 the
scope of the tribe’s reserved right for fish had been substantially diminished
and were limited to the “minimum instream flow necessary to maintain
anadromous fish life in the river, according to annual prevailing
conditions.”145
The Washington Supreme Court affirmed in a puzzling 1993 decision.
Employing standard rules of treaty interpretation, the court noted that
ambiguities must be interpreted in the tribes’ favor, and therefore ruled that
neither a 1906 federal statute authorizing dams in the Yakima Basin, nor a
1914 statute expanding the tribe’s irrigation water rights, nor other
government actions over the years terminated the tribe’s fishing rights.146
But, in an apparent effort to avoid ordering a restoration of treaty-time
streamflows, the court concluded that a series of unspecified government
actions between 1905 and 1968 produced “encroachment upon and
significant damage to the Indians’ treaty fishing rights,” and consequently
“substantially diminished”—though they did not abrogate—such rights.147
Thus, the court affirmed the trial court’s ruling that the Yakama’s reserved
water for fishing was limited to the minimal amount necessary to maintain

832 F.2d 1127, 1131–32 (9th Cir. 1987) (distinguishing the priority dates of reserved water for
fish and reserved water for irrigation). Because reserved water for fish is necessary to fulfill a
use that pre-dated the Indian treaties and reservations—and which the treaties and reservations
aimed to preserve—it has been referred to as a Winans right, after the seminal Supreme Court
case of United States v. Winans, 198 U.S. 371 (1905). See United States v. Abousleman,
83cv01041-JEC-ACE, at 26–27 (D.N.M. Oct. 4, 2004), available at http://www.ose.state.nm.us/
water-info/CourtOrders/JemezRiver/Jemez1.pdf; 4 WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS, supra note 2,
§ 37.02(a)–(b) (distinguishing Winans rights from Winters rights). On the Winans decision, see
Michael C. Blumm & James Brunberg, Not Much Less Necessary Than the Atmosphere They

Breathed: Salmon, Indian Treaties, and the Supreme Court—A Centennial Remembrance of
United States v. Winans and Its Enduring Significance, 46 NAT. RES. J. (forthcoming 2006).
143 See Wash. Dep’t of Ecology v. Acquavella (Acquavella I ) , 674 P.2d 160, 165 (Wash. 1983)
(stating that due process rights of individual water users were not violated when process was
served on individual users’ water distributors in lieu of providing individual notice).
144 Acquavella II, 850 P.2d at 1310.
145

Id.
Id. at 1321–22. The Yakima Project is a series of 11 storage and diversion dams on the
Yakima River and its tributaries, including two hydropower plants. See generally Bureau of
146

Reclamation, U.S. Dep’t of the Interior, Yakima Project: Washington, http://www.usbr.gov/
dataweb/html/yakima.html (last visited Nov. 12, 2006) (describing the history, organization, and
operation of the dams, power plants, and associated facilities which constitute the Yakima
Project).
147 Acquavella II, 850 P.2d at 1323.
We therefore cannot conclude that the inconsistent actions of Congress, the executive
branch and administrative agencies, were sufficient, in and of themselves, to extinguish
those reserved water rights necessary to fulfill treaty fishing rights. We conclude,
however, that there was encroachment upon and significant damage to the Indians’
treaty fishing rights during this period. Thus, although the treaty rights were not
extinguished, they were diminished.

Id.
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salmon, according to annual prevailing conditions.148 This unprecedented
interpretation of diminishing—or partially abrogating—treaty rights, despite
a lack of clear intent to abrogate, was inconsistent with Supreme Court
standards.149
The court drew support for its diminishment rationale from a 1968
Indian Claims Commission settlement, in which the tribe accepted $2.1
million for damage to its fishing rights occurring as a result of dam
construction, unscreened irrigation diversions, and the like.150 But while the
claims commission had jurisdiction to award damages, it had no jurisdiction
to take or diminish treaty rights, a fact subsequently noted by the New
Mexico Court of Appeals in refusing to follow the Washington Supreme
Court’s reasoning.151

B. The Situation Today
The Washington Supreme Court decision seemed to be a crushing
blow to the Yakama Nation’s efforts to restore salmon runs to the Yakima
Basin. But in 1995 the trial court in the McCarran adjudication
interpreted the Supreme Court’s recognition of a limited habitat right “to
maintain fish life” in the river as requiring both tributary flows and
flushing flows in the mainstem.152 “The latter decision required the
Bureau of Reclamation to release some 600 acre-feet of storage water for
fish migration.”153
In ensuing years, the Yakama Nation has successfully litigated and
negotiated to obtain “wet” rights based on its reserved water rights and
to keep additional water in the Yakima River and its tributaries. After the
federal court’s decision protecting the imperiled salmon redds from

148
149

Id. at 1310.

In United States v. Dion, 476 U.S. 734, 739–40 (1986), the Court required clear
congressional intent to abrogate treaty rights, a result of which the Washington Supreme Court
was quite aware. See Acquavella II, 850 P.2d at 1321 (citing Dion). For criticism, see Michael C.
Blumm & Brett M. Swift, The Indian Piscary Profit and Habitat Protection in the Pacific
Northwest: A Property Rights Approach, 69 U. COLO. L. REV. 407, 476 (1998) (“Under this
unprecedented interpretation, inconsistent government actions may apparently substantially
diminish treaty rights, despite a lack of clear congressional intent that is required for abrogation
of those rights. This result . . . invites . . . courts to find such ‘diminishments’ of treaty rights on
the basis of judicial interpretations of history.”).
150 Acquavella II, 850 P.2d at 1323–24 (citing Yakama Tribe of Indians v. United States, 20
Indian Claims Comm’n Decisions 76, 89 (1968)).
151 State ex rel. Martinez v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 898 P.2d 1256, 1260 (N.M. Ct. App. 1995) (“We
note that State Department of Ecology, 850 P.2d at 1324–25 (applying Washington state law), is
contrary. However, because the opinion failed to analyze the effect of the ICC’s [Indian Claims
Commission] limited jurisdiction, as well as the dissimilarity in the causes of action and parties,
we do not find that opinion persuasive and decline to follow it.”).
152 See ROYSTER & BLUMM, supra note 50, at 414 (citing Water Order Re Treaty Reserved
Rights at Usual and Accustomed Fishing Places, Wash. Dep’t of Ecology v. Acquavella, No. 77-201484-5, (Wash. Sup. Ct. Mar. 1, 1995) and Order Re Flushing Flows, Wash. Dep’t of Ecology v.
Acquavella, No. 77-2-01484-5 (Wash. Sup. Ct. Apr. 13, 1995)).
153 Blumm & Swift, supra note 149, at 477–78.
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dewatering in 1980,154 the Bureau of Reclamation began operating the
Yakima Project155 using “flip-flop operations,” which means annually
reducing flows in the upper arm of the Yakima River, while increasing
flows in the Naches River, an upper tributary of the Yakima, to ensure
that spring chinook salmon redds remain inundated.156 In 1994, after the
Washington Supreme Court recognized the Yakama Nation’s “diminished”
instream flow rights,157 Congress passed the Yakima River Basin Water
Enhancement Project Act.158 One goal of this statute was to provide
increased instream flows to protect salmon and steelhead runs.159 The
legislation included specific numerical criteria for instream flows,
including target flows at two dams in the Yakima Project.160 The statute
also established a Conservation Advisory Group, including
representatives of the Yakama Nation and other stakeholders, to provide
recommendations for a basinwide conservation program.161
The Yakama Nation has also been successful in directly influencing
the operations of the Yakima Project to improve instream flows for fish
protection. The Yakama now have a voice in setting the level of instream
flows through the Yakima Project System Operations Advisory
Committee, a group of fishery biologists (including biologists from the
Yakama Indian Nation), which advises the Bureau of Reclamation
Secretary of the Interior regarding annual biologically-based flows for
salmon protection.162 The Secretary uses these recommendations to
determine the flows necessary to maintain all the life stages of the fish in
the Yakima River and tributaries.163 The Yakama Nation retains the right

154 See Kittitas Reclamation Dist. v. Sunnyside Valley Irrigation Dist., 763 F.2d 1032, 1033–34
(9th Cir. 1985) (describing the district court ordering of the release of water stored behind the
Cle Elum Dam to protect salmon redds).
155 See supra note 146 (describing the organization and operation of the Yakima Project).
156 Telephone Interview by David Becker with Tim Weaver, Attorney for the Yakama Nation,
Yakima, Wash. (Mar. 21, 2006) [hereinafter Interview with Tim Weaver]; see also Press Release,
U.S. Dep’t of the Interior, Bureau of Reclamation, Yakima Project “Flip-Flop” Operation to
Begin (Aug. 30, 2005), available at http://www.usbr.gov/newsroom/newsrelease/detail.cfm?
RecordID=7462 (describing the “flip-flop” river flow operation to encourage salmon to spawn at
relatively low flows).
157 Acquavella II, 850 P.2d 1306, 1323 (Wash. 1993).
158 Pub. L. No. 103-434, tit. XII, 108 Stat. 4526, 4550 (1994).
159 See id. § 1201(1), 108 Stat. at 4550 (stating the purpose as “to protect, mitigate, and
enhance fish and wildlife through . . . improved instream flows”); id. § 1203(d)(2), 108 Stat. at
4554 (stating “to improve streamflow and fish passage conditions”).
160 Id. § 1205(a)(1)(B), (a)(2)(A)–(B), 108 Stat. at 4557–58.
161 Id. § 1203(c), 108 Stat. at 4552–53.
162 Interview with Tim Weaver, supra note 156; see also YAKIMA NATION STAFF, WATER FOR
INSTREAM FLOWS, available at http://www.waterpolicy.wa.gov/2002/papers/flows/Vyvyan.doc
(describing the role of the System Operations Advisory Committee in determining instream
flow); R.C. BAIN ASSOCS. & MONTGOMERY WATER GROUP, TECHNICAL MEMORANDUM YAKIMA RIVER
BASIN WATERSHED PLAN: WATER SUPPLY NEEDS FOR INSTREAM FLOWS 4–5 (Jan. 2002), available at
http://www.co.yakima.wa.us/TriCnty/Technical%20Memorandum/T330-Instream.pdf
(summarizing a report issued by the System Operations Advisory Committee to the Secretary of
the Interior that outlines a program to establish biologically based flows).
163 See R.C. BAIN, supra note 162, at 4–5.
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to have the state court enforce minimum flows under prior orders in the

Acquavella adjudication, but to date it has not had to do so.164
The Yakama Nation has also participated in negotiations that have
led to the settlement of water rights claims in the ongoing adjudication,
resulting in several irrigation districts agreeing to give up part of their
claims to water rights and implement water conservation projects to
enhance instream flows.165 For example, in 2003, a settlement among the
Sunnyside Division, the Washington Department of Ecology, the Bureau
of Reclamation, and the Yakama Nation gave Sunnyside and its members
confirmed water rights of 435,422 acre-feet.166 Sunnyside waived its
claims to another 23,098 acre-feet, reducing the demand on Yakima Basin
streamflows,167 and also agreed to implement water conservation
projects by 2016 that will achieve a total savings of 29,162 acre-feet of
water, two-thirds of which will augment Yakima Basin flows.168 Although
all parties agreed to keep these improved instream flows to satisfy the
Yakama Nation’s reserved water rights and Yakima Project’s purposes,169
the settlement is silent as to the legal mechanism for doing so.170 The
federal Bureau of Reclamation holds title to the water, but only the state
of Washington can hold title to instream flow rights under state law.171
Because the Bureau does not want to relinquish title, one possibility is a
long-term (e.g. ninety-nine year), nominal-fee lease from the federal
government to the state that would allow the state to place the water
rights into the state trust water rights program.172
Thus, through litigation, negotiation, and settlement, the Yakama
Nation has been able to improve Yakima Basin streamflows for fish
habitat protection over the last two decades. The tribe has not invariably
triumphed in court,173 but judicial recognition of the existence of its
164

Interview with Tim Weaver, supra note 156.
See, e.g., Press Release, Wash. Dep’t of Ecology, Agreement Settles Major Water-Right
Claims (May 8, 2003), available at http://www.ecy.wa.gov/news/2003news/2003-083.html
[hereinafter Sunnyside Agreement] (describing the settlement between Sunnyside Division, the
Washington State Department of Ecology, the U.S. Department of the Interior for the Bureau of
Reclamation, and the Yakama Nation).
166 See Notice of Sunnyside Div. Water Rights Settlement Agreement at 2–9, In re Matter of
the Determination of the Rights to the Use of the Surface Waters of the Yakima River Drainage
Basin, No. 1752 (Sup. Ct. Yakima County May 12, 2003) (on file with authors) [hereinafter
Sunnyside Water Rights Settlement Agreement] (enumerating details for six of the water rights
agreed upon in the settlement).
167 Sunnyside Agreement, supra note 165.
168 Sunnyside Water Rights Settlement Agreement, supra note 166, at 17–19.
169 Id. at 12 (listing the uses for which the remaining water may satisfy the Yakama Nation’s
reserved water rights and project purposes).
170 Telephone Interview by David Becker with Dan Haller, Envtl. Eng’r, Water Res. Program,
Wash. State Dep’t of Ecology, in Yakima, Wash. (Mar. 28, 2006).
165

171
172

Id.
Id.

173 However, the tribe has won every action filed in the Acquavella adjudication since the
Washington Supreme Court’s decision in 1993. E-mail from Tim Weaver, Attorney for the
Yakama Nation, to Michael Blumm (Aug. 3, 2006) (on file with author). The tribe’s attorney
considered this track record to have deterred irrigator challenges and now “reason generally
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reserved water right for fish equipped the tribe with leverage that it has
been able to successfully employ in administrative and congressional
fora, producing some promise of restored salmon runs in the Yakima
Basin after over a century of decline.
V. THE GILA RIVER SETTLEMENTS: WATER QUALITY, A CHALLENGE TO PIA, AND
SOME WET WATER
The Gila River, a tributary of the Colorado River, is one of the
largest desert rivers in the world, historically flowing for some 630 miles.
It rises in the mountains of western New Mexico, flows southwest
through the Gila National Forest, through the San Carlos Apache
Reservation in eastern Arizona, and then westward across Arizona,
where it flows through the Gila River Indian Community (GRIC)
southwest of Phoenix. Below Phoenix, due to agricultural and municipal
diversions, the river is largely a trickle; prior to water project
development it flowed intermittently into the Colorado River near Yuma,
Arizona.174 The Gila was largely excluded from the epic Supreme Court
litigation over the Colorado River that pitted Arizona against
California.175
The GRIC includes twenty-two villages within a 580-square mile
reservation in central Arizona, southwest of Phoenix.176 Congress
established the reservation, shared by the Akimel O’odham (Pima) and
the Pee Posh (Maricopa) people, in 1859.177 The people of the GRIC
traditionally depended on agricultural crops watered by the Gila River for
their livelihood.178

prevails.” Id.
174 ARIZ. DEP’T OF WATER RES., LOWER GILA RIVER WATERSHED 1 (2005), available at
http://www.azwater.gov/dwr/Content/Find_by_Program/Rural_Programs/OutsideAMAs_PDFs_f
or_web/Lower_Colorado_River_Planning_Area/Lower_Gila_River_Watershed.pdf [hereinafter
LOWER GILA RIVER WATERSHED]; see also NEW WEST ENCYCLOPEDIA, supra note 16, at 428
(describing the Gila as the “master stream” of central Arizona, historically contributing “well
over” one million acre-feet of water to the Colorado River); U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, NAT’L
WATER QUALITY INVENTORY REPORT: REPORT To CONGRESS 192 (1994), available at
http://www.epa.gov/owow/305b/94report/gilariv.pdf [hereinafter WATER QUALITY INVENTORY
REPORT] (describing the Gila river); Wikipedia, Gila River, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/
Gila_River (last visited Nov. 12, 2006).
175 Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546, 594–95 (1963); see also 4 WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS,
supra note 2, § 37.01(b)(3) (explaining that the suit determined water rights to the Colorado
River); Chambers & Echohawk, supra note 4, at 453 (noting that the five tribes in the case were
awarded over 900,000 acre-feet of water from the Colorado River to irrigate 135,000 acres).
176 WATER QUALITY INVENTORY REPORT, supra note 174, at 192.
177 Arizona Water Settlements Act: J. Hearing on S. 437 Before the Subcomm. on Water and
Power of the Comm. on Energy and Natural Resources and the Comm. on Indian Affairs, 108th

Cong. 23 (2003) (testimony of Richard Narcia, Governor, Gila River Indian Community),
available at http://energy.senate.gov/earings/testimony.cfm?id=945&wit_id=2661.
178 Id.
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A. The Globe Equity Decree and Ensuing Litigation
In 1937, the United States government completed Coolidge Dam,
creating the San Carlos Reservoir179 on the Gila River upstream from the
community and downstream of the San Carlos Apache Reservation. The
dam’s purpose was to store flood waters, half of which were reserved for
allottees on the GRIC.180 Downstream of Coolidge Dam, the Gila flows to the
Ashurst Hayden Dam, which diverts water to the GRIC and to non-Indian
irrigators.181 Below Ashurst Hayden Dam, the river is ephemeral, flowing
only in response to precipitation or water releases from upstream dams.182
While there is now no consistent streamflow on the reservation, the river
was intermittent pre-development.183
There has been considerable conflict over Gila River flows over the past
eighty years, the precipitating event being congressional authorization of the
Coolidge Dam in 1924 for the primary purpose of providing water to allotted
lands on the GRIC.184 The next year, the federal government filed suit,
seeking a judicial determination of the rights and priorities of both Indians
and non-Indians to Gila River streamflows.185 A decade later, the parties
agreed to a consent decree, the 1935 Globe Equity Decree (so named
because it was entered by the federal district court located in the city of
Globe), which established the measure, extent, and limits of the rights of all
the parties and their successors in interest to divert the waters of the Gila
River. Without expressly mentioning reserved rights, the decree recognized
that the Pima Indians of the GRIC had an “immemorial” priority right to
179 See CRAIG RUSSON, JERRY HORN & STEVE OLIVER, A CASE STUDY OF GILA RIVER INDIAN
COMMUNITY (ARIZONA) AND ITS ROLE AS A PARTNER IN THE NSF-SUPPORTED UCAN RURAL SYSTEMIC
INITIATIVE (RSI) 2 (2000), available at http://www.wmich.edu/evalctr/rsi/gila_river.pdf (tracing
the history and current condition of the GRIC).
180 Act of June 7, 1924, ch. 288, 43 Stat. 475, 475 (providing for the continuing construction of
the San Carlos Federal Irrigation project). See infra note 184 (quoting the congressional
purpose of the Act).
181 E-mail from Gregg Houtz, Attorney, Ariz. Water Res. Dep’t, to David Becker (July 7, 2006,
9:36:12 PST) (on file with author) [hereinafter Houtz E-mail].
182 LOWER GILA RIVER WATERSHED, supra note 174, at 1 (2005).
183 Houtz E-mail, supra note 181. In the Lower Gila River watershed, most streamflow is
ephemeral: flows occur only in response to precipitation events or water releases from
upstream dams. Historically, the river would flow in the spring due to winter rains and melting
snow, and in summer following monsoon rains. See LOWER GILA RIVER WATERSHED, supra note
174, at 1 (“[f]low in the lower portion of the Gila River would be intermittent if it were not
controlled by dams”).
184 Act of June 7, 1924, ch. 288, 43 Stat. 475. The Act states that the federal government built
the dam

for the purpose, first, of providing water for the irrigation of lands allotted to Pima
Indians on the Gila River Reservation, Arizona, now without an adequate supply of water
and, second, for the irrigation of such other lands in public or private ownership, as in
the opinion of the . . . Secretary [of the Interior], can be served . . . without diminishing
the supply necessary for said Indian lands . . . .

Id.
185 United States v. Gila Valley Irrigation Dist., 961 F.2d 1432, 1433 (9th Cir. 1992) (citation
omitted).
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120,000 acre-feet of irrigation water, and the Apaches above the reservoir
had an 1846 priority date (prior to all other diverters) to 6,000 acre-feet of
irrigation water.186
Implementation of the Globe Equity Decree produced numerous legal
skirmishes over the years.187 One pathbreaking judicial result was the 1994
decision of the federal district court ruling that irrigators upstream of the
San Carlos Apache Reservation had to allow the tribe’s 6,000 acre-feet of
irrigation water to flow undiverted, in order to ensure that the quality of the
water delivered to the reservation was sufficient to grow crops, the first
decision to recognize the important proposition that water quality was a
component of reserved rights.188 Encouraged by the Supreme Court’s
expansive view of the McCarran Amendment’s waiver of federal sovereign
immunity,189 the Salt River Valley Water Users Association initiated what
became the Gila River adjudication in 1974.190 Between 1992 and 2006, the

186 United States v. Gila Valley Irrigation Dist., No. E-59-Globe, at 86 (D. Ariz. 1935); see
United States v. Gila Valley Irrigation Dist., 454 F.2d 219, 220–21 (9th Cir. 1972) (discussing
section 8(2) of the 1935 decree, which authorized junior upper valley users to divert an amount
of the “natural flow” equal to the amount of stored water in the San Carlos Reservoir behind the
Coolidge Dam; the latter would be used to serve the senior rights of the GRIC); see also Gila
Valley Irrigation Dist. v. United States, 118 F.2d 507, 508–09 (9th Cir. 1941) (reprinting section
8(2)). The Ninth Circuit interpreted the decree to establish “two entirely different water rights
involved in the adjudication; one, the right to the natural flow of the stream . . . and, the other,
the right to use the water stored in the dam when needed.” Id. at 510. The “natural flow” rights
of the San Carlos Apache Tribe would lead to the water quality decision discussed infra note
187 and accompanying text.
187 See Gila Valley Irrigation Dist., 118 F.2d at 509 (holding that water flowing out of the San
Carlos Reservoir at the same rate as inflow was “natural flow” within the meaning of the Globe
Equity Decree and, thus, did not count toward “stored water” available to the lower valley); Gila
Valley Irrigation Dist., 454 F.2d at 221 (ruling that the water commission erred in allowing
increased diversions in the upper valley without considering the effects on the senior Pima
Indians in the lower valley); Gila Valley Irrigation Dist., 961 F.2d at 1439 (determining that
although the Globe Equity Decree did not require specific water quantity calculation methods, it
did require the state water commission to deduct water lost in transit when calculating the
amount of water available to the lower valley).
188 United States v. Gila Valley Irrigation Dist., 920 F. Supp. 1444, 1456 (D. Ariz. 1996), aff’d
177 F.3d 425 (9th Cir. 1997) (adopting the reasoning of the district court).
189 The Court first ruled that federal reserved water rights were included within the
McCarran Amendment waiver in United States v. District Court ex rel. Eagle County, 401 U.S.
520, 524 (1971). The Court subsequently clarified that the waiver included Indian reserved rights
in Colorado Water Conservation District v. United States. 424 U.S. 800, 805 (1976). Then, when
the San Carlos Apache Tribe claimed that it should not be subjected to the Gila River
adjudication against its will because Arizona disclaimed any jurisdiction over Indian tribes in its
statehood act (as did several other western states), the Court rejected that argument in favor of
avoiding “duplicative and wasteful” concurrent federal and state proceedings. Arizona v. San
Carlos Apache Tribe, 463 U.S. 545, 567 (1983); see also 4 WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS, supra note 2,
§ 37.04(a)(1) (citing the potentially duplicative nature of concurrent federal and state
proceedings as one factor used by the Supreme Court in Colorado Water Conservation District
v. United States, 424 U.S. 800 (1976)).
190 The initial petition sought a determination of rights in the Salt, Verde, and San Pedro
rivers, but the case was later expanded to include the Gila, Santa Cruz, and Agua Fria rivers. See
Lindsay Murphy, Death of a Monster: Laws May Finally Kill Gila River Adjudication, 28 AM.
INDIAN L. REV. 173, 178 (2003).
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Arizona Supreme Court produced six major decisions in the Gila
adjudication.191
The most significant of these decisions were the Arizona Supreme
Court landmark rulings in 1999 and 2001, which—disagreeing with the
Wyoming Supreme Court on several issues192—held that 1) groundwater
could be the subject of a reserved rights claim,193 2) the purpose of
establishing an Indian reservation was to create a “permanent home and
abiding place,”194 and 3) the standard measurement for reserved irrigation
water—“practicably irrigable acreage” (PIA)—was not the exclusive
191 All of the cases are captioned In re Gen. Adjudication of All Rights to Use Water in the
Gila River System & Source with the exception of the first, which is captioned In re the Rights
to Use the Gila River. In the second, the court upheld the postal and publication notice given to
the potential claimants as sufficient where some 849,000 property owners who could be located
received mail notice, while publication notice was provided to property owners who could not
be located. In re the Rights to Use the Gila River (Gila River I ) , 830 P.2d 442, 455–56 (Ariz.
1992). In Gila River II, the court ruled that “subflow”—which is subject to the same
appropriation rules as surface water—included only water that is “immediately adjacent to” the
bed of the surface stream itself, thus rejecting a more expansive approach adopted by the trial
court. In re Gen. Adjudication of All Rights to Use Water in the Gila River Sys. & Source (Gila
River II ) , 857 P.2d 1236, 1245–46 (Ariz. 1993). In the third, the court held that Indian reserved
rights extended to groundwater where surface flows were not adequate to fulfill the purpose of
the reservation. In re Gen. Adjudication of All Rights to Use Water in the Gila River Sys. &
Source (Gila River III ) , 989 P.2d 739, 741, 747–48 (Ariz. 1999). In the fourth, the court upheld
the trial court’s revised (and narrower) definition of “subflow.” In re Gen. Adjudication of All
Rights to Use Water in the Gila River Sys. & Source (Gila River IV), 9 P.3d 1069, 1076–77 (Ariz.
2000). In the fifth, the court rejected applying the “practicably irrigable acreage” standard to
quantifying Indian reserved rights for agriculture, since the purpose of Indian reservations was
to provide a “permanent home and abiding place,” which requires water for multiple uses, and
may or may not include irrigated agriculture; consequently, the court adopted a multi-factor test
for quantification, including a tribe’s historical use of water and its cultural importance, as well
as, geography, topography, and feasible and economically sound tribal development plans
requiring water. In re Gen. Adjudication of All Rights to Use Water in the Gila River Sys. &
Source (Gila River V), 35 P.3d 68, 74–81 (Ariz. 2001). In the sixth, the court rejected tribal claims
for additional water beyond that recognized in the Globe Equity Decree, concluding that res
judicata precluded the claims, even though the tribe was not a party to the decree; however, the
court also ruled that the decree did not determine rights to Gila River tributaries. In re Gen.
Adjudication of All Rights to Use Water in the Gila River Sys. & Source (Gila River VI ) , 127 P.3d
882, 903 (Ariz. 2006).
192 See supra notes 99–110 and accompanying text (discussing the Big Horn decision, where
the Wyoming Supreme Court ruled against the tribe on instream issues and reserved
groundwater, and used the “practicably irrigable acres” test to measure the scope of a reserved
irrigation right).
193 Gila River III, 989 P.2d at 745–46 (“We can appreciate the hesitation of the Big Horn court
to break new ground, but we do not find its reasoning persuasive.”). The court determined that
“[t]he significant question for the purpose of the reserved rights doctrine is not whether the
water runs above or below the ground but whether it is necessary to accomplish the purpose of
the reservation.” Id. at 747; see 4 WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS, supra note 2, § 37.02(d)
(emphasizing that reserved waters should “extend to all waters reasonably necessary to fulfill
the reservations purpose” and questioning the Wyoming court’s exclusion of groundwater from
reserved waters).
194 Gila River V, 35 P.3d at 76. See generally Barbara A. Cosens, The Measure of Indian Water
Rights: The Arizona Homeland Standard, Gila River Adjudication, 42 NAT. RESOURCES J. 835,
845–63 (2002) (analyzing the Arizona Supreme Court’s homeland standard’s purpose and
measure).
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measure of reserved water.195 The court concluded that basing the scope of
reserved rights on potential irrigation in the twenty-first century was
inequitable, anachronistic, and potentially overly generous:
A permanent homeland requires water for multiple uses, which may or may not
include agriculture. The PIA standard, however, forces ‘tribes to prove
economic feasibility for a kind of enterprise that, judging from the evidence of
both federal and private willingness to invest money, is simply no longer
economically feasible in the West.’196

To replace PIA, the court adopted a two-part feasibility test, which
considered whether the proposed use was 1) practicably achievable and
2) economically sound, and suggested a multi-factor test to employ in
quantifying reserved rights, including considering historic tribal dependence
on water and its cultural significance, both of which might affect instream
flows.197
Even prior to the Arizona Supreme Court’s 2001 decision, the GRIC and
other parties to the adjudication negotiated a settlement.198 After the
decision, Congress adopted that settlement in 2004, incorporating it into the
Arizona Water Settlements Act.199 That statute promised the GRIC 653,500
acre-feet of water from the Central Arizona Project and the Gila, Salt, and
Verde rivers.200 The Act also provided funding for the GRIC to build a new
water delivery system, supplying total estimated economic benefits of $200–
400 million.201 The statute did not restrict the GRIC’s use of the water on its
reservation, and also specified that the GRIC may lease a portion of its water
to off-reservation water users.202
195

Gila River V, 35 P.3d at 78–81.
Id. at 78 (quoting Martha C. Franks, The Uses of the Practicably Irrigable Acreage
Standard in the Quantification of Reserved Water Rights, 31 NAT. RESOURCES J. 549, 578 (1991)).
197 Id. at 79–81. The non-exclusive list of factors the court outlined included: 1) a tribe’s
196

historic dependence on water, 2) the cultural significance of water to the tribe, 3) the tribe’s
land and natural resources in relation to the most efficient use of water, 4) whether the tribe’s
current economic status corresponded to the proposed economic development and its
attendant water use, 5) whether the tribe traditionally used water in the proposed manner, and
6) the tribe’s present and projected population. Id. at 79–80.
198 See Gila River Settlement and Little Colorado River Negotiations, in NEGOTIATING TRIBAL
WATER RIGHTS, supra note 78, at 134.
199 Arizona Water Settlements Act, Pub. L. No. 108-451, 118 Stat. 3478 (2004).
200 See id. (providing adjustments to allocation of water from the Central Arizona Project
and authorizing the GRIC water rights settlement); see also Kraker, supra note 122 (noting that
the GRIC settlement would win GRIC extensive water rights); Betty Beard, Water Accords
Joyous to Tribe, THE ARIZ. REPUBLIC, Apr. 23, 2005, available at http://www.azcentral.com/
community/ahwatukee/articles/0423ar-gilawater23Z14.html (noting that the law guarantees
GRIC 653,500 acre-feet of water a year). The settlement called for 173,100 acre-feet for the
Pima-Maricopa Indian Irrigation Project, to irrigate some 77,000 acres of GRIC farmland. The
GRIC’s 1984 Master Plan envisioned a 146,000-acre farm, which the settlement’s 653,500 acrefeet would theoretically serve, although only 77,000 acres will be irrigated in the near-term. See
Houtz E-mail, supra note 181.
201 See Gila River Settlement, supra note 198, at 134; Beard, supra note 200.
202 Telephone Interview by David Becker with Gregg Houtz, Attorney, Ariz. Dep’t of Water
Res., in Phoenix, Ariz. (Mar. 20, 2006) [hereinafter Interview with Gregg Houtz]; see also Gila
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The settlement neither authorized nor prohibited the GRIC from using a
portion of its irrigation water to instream flows, but presumably the
community may do so under its water code or by a decision of the GRIC
Council.203 The Arizona Water Resources Department will have no
involvement concerning any on-reservation change of use.204

B. The Situation Today
The GRIC is now developing the Pima-Maricopa Irrigation Project to
irrigate some 146,000 acres of agricultural land on-reservation, a plan that
envisions using some of that water to restore riparian habitat, including
recreational fisheries.205 However, because the tribes of the GRIC were
traditionally agricultural, and there was no significant fishery in the lower
Gila River due to its intermittent nature, the GRIC does not anticipate using
its water to restore historical flows in the Gila River.206 In addition, although
Arizona is one of three states (besides Alaska and Nevada) which allow a
private party to hold instream flow rights,207 the settlement does not
authorize the GRIC to obtain additional off-reservation water, or to market
its settlement water off-reservation, except leasing to surrounding
communities.208
VI. PYRAMID LAKE RESTORATION: EFFECTUATING FEDERAL RESERVED RIGHTS
THROUGH STATE IMPLEMENTATION
In its natural state, Pyramid Lake was the second largest inland lake in
the western United States.209 The lake is fed by the Truckee River, which
carries the outflow from Lake Tahoe.210 Lower, shallower, warmer, and more
saline than Lake Tahoe, Pyramid Lake—located around forty miles northeast
of Reno, Nevada—is the largest remnant of Lake Lahontan, which covered
much of northwestern Nevada at the end of the Ice Age. Although at fifteen
miles long and eleven miles wide, it is now only one-tenth the size of the
Great Salt Lake, Pyramid Lake has twenty-five percent more volume.
The Pyramid Lake Paiute occupied the lake area when it was first
mapped by John C. Fremont in 1844. The lake and the surrounding area was
set aside by the Bureau of Indian Affairs for the Northern Paiute in 1859 and
River Settlement, supra note 198, at 134 (describing the authorization of water leasing).
203 Interview with Gregg Houtz, supra note 202.
204 Id.
205 Susan Randall, Gila River Tribe Plans to Restore Farms, CASA GRANDE DISPATCH, Oct. 12,
2004, available at http://www.zwire.com/site/news.cfm?newsid=13123742&BRD=1817&PAG=
461&dept_id=68561&rfi=8; Interview with Gregg Houtz, supra note 202 (reporting that only
some 77,000 acres are likely to be irrigated in the near-term; see supra note 200).
206 Interview with Gregg Houtz, supra note 202.
207

DAVID M. GILLILAN & THOMAS C. BROWN, INSTREAM FLOW PROTECTION 120 (1997).
Interview with Gregg Houtz, supra note 202.
209 ROYSTER & BLUMM, supra note 50, at 446.
210 NEW WEST ENCYCLOPEDIA, supra note 16, at 931; United States v. Alpine Land & Reservoir
Co., 340 F.3d 903, 910 (9th Cir. 2003) (describing Pyramid Lake).
208
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confirmed by President Grant as one of the first executive order Indian
reservations in 1874.211 Today, the lake, which supports populations of
Lahontan cutthroat trout212 and cui-ui213—both of which are listed under the
Endangered Species Act214—lies entirely within the reservation, as do the
lower twenty-five miles of the Truckee River.
Pyramid Lake fish are listed under the ESA because of the effects of the
Newlands Project, the nation’s first reclamation project, which produced the
Derby Dam in 1905215 that in turn blocked fish passage to spawning grounds
and diverted water bound for Pyramid Lake into Lahontan Reservoir on the
Carson River for irrigation. Without adequate river flows from its only
source, the lake became more saline (now one-sixth as saline as the ocean)
and declined some seventy vertical feet.216 As a result, the Pyramid Lake
Tribe and the federal government fought a long series of legal battles
attempting to restore Truckee River flows and the Pyramid Lake ecosystem.

211 See United States v. Truckee-Carson Irrigation Dist., 649 F.2d 1286, 1290 (9th Cir. 1981)
(describing the history of the reservation).
212 Lahontan cutthroat trout, the largest of the cutthroat species and the state fish of Nevada,
were essential to the Northern Paiute’s subsistence and also became an export fish of some
renown (up to a million pounds annually) in the late 19th century, marketed throughout the
West, especially to western mining towns. Although the species, which is endemic to the
Truckee River drainage and several other nearby drainages, was not irreparably damaged by the
heavy harvests, it did not fare so well at the hands of the Derby Dam, constructed in 1905,
which blocked spawning migration and diverted flows from the Truckee into the Lahontan
Reservoir, thereby impairing water quality in the lower river and in Pyramid Lake. By 1943, the
Pyramid Lake population of Lahontan cutthroat was extinct. The lake and river have since been
restocked with populations from other drainages and subsist today with hatcheries managed by
the tribe because the lake is too saline and the river flows inadequate to produce sustainable
spawning. See U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERV., RECOVERY PLAN FOR THE LAHONTAN CUTTHROAT TROUT
7–10 (1995).
213 Cui-ui, another staple of the Northern Pauite diet (they call themselves “Cuiyui Tichutta,”
or cui-ui eaters), is a large sucker fish (females reaching two feet long and six pounds) endemic
to Pyramid Lake. Cui-ui are long-lived—the average life-span is 40 years—which explains how
the species managed to survive with virtually no recruitment during the 1970s and 1980s due to
poor water quality and quantity in the Truckee River, where they must spawn. Improved river
conditions since the 1990s have led to a rebound in cui-ui populations, but they remain listed
under the Endangered Species Act. See NatureServe Explorer, Chasmistes cujus, Cui-ui,
http://www.natureserve.org/explorer/servlet/NatureServe?searchName=Chasmistes+cujus (last
visited Nov. 12, 2006) (providing conservation status data and ecology and life history
information for Cui-ui); see also Wikipedia, Cui-ui, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cui-ui (last
visited Nov. 12, 2006).
214 Threatened Status for Three Species of Trout, 40 Fed. Reg. 29,863, 29,864 (July 16, 1975)
(cutthroat); Native Fish and Wildlife Endangered Species, 32 Fed. Reg. 4001 (Mar. 11, 1967)
(cui-ui).
215 Only 15 days after the enactment of the 1902 Reclamation Act, 32 Stat. 388 (1902), the
brainchild of Senator Francis Newlands (D-Nev.), the Secretary of the Interior withdrew some
200,000 acres in Nevada for the Newlands Reclamation Project. Derby Dam diverted water into
the Truckee Canal and transported out-of-basin to the Lahontan Reservoir on the Carson River
drainage for distribution to irrigators. See ROYSTER & BLUMM, supra note 50, at 446.
216 See Pyramid Lake Paiute Tribe of Indians v. Morton, 354 F. Supp. 252, 255 (D.D.C. 1972),
rev’d, 499 F.2d 1095 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (describing the effects of Derby Dam on Pyramid Lake); see
also Wikipedia, Pyramid Lake, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pyramid_Lake (last visited Nov. 12,
2006).
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A. Pyramid Lake Litigation: The Federal Trust and Some State
Implementation
The first litigation over Truckee River flows, occasioned by the
construction of Derby Dam, began in 1913, brought by the federal
government to secure water rights for the Pyramid Lake Reservation. Over
thirty years later, the case settled, producing what became known as the
1944 Orr Ditch Decree. That decree recognized 32,000 acre-feet of reserved
water for tribal irrigation, with an 1859 priority, but the federal government
asked for no reserved water for the Pyramid Lake Paiute Tribe’s fisheries.217
The Orr Ditch Decree did not allocate rights to all the water in the
Truckee River, at least not in above-average water years. So, in 1972 the
Pyramid Lake Paiute Tribe—in the first water case in which a tribe sued its
trustee, the federal government—sought to enjoin the government from
allocating waters in excess of the Orr Ditch Decree to local irrigators.218 In
what retrospectively might seem to be a surprising result, the district court
agreed with the tribe that the federal government had violated its trust
obligation, ruling that the government had breached its fiduciary
responsibility by allocating excess water on the basis of a “judgment call.”219
The court ordered the secretary “to assert his statutory and contractual
authority to the fullest extent possible [to formulate a closely developed
regulation that would preserve water for the tribe.]”220
The tribe’s successful assertion of the trust doctrine concerned only
excess waters not allocated by the Orr Ditch Decree. The next year, in 1973,
the federal government sought to reopen the allocations in the Orr Ditch
Decree, finally claiming water rights for the tribe’s fishery.221 The district
court dismissed the case on res judicata grounds, but the Ninth Circuit
reversed, finding a lack of adversity between the government and the
Truckee-Carson Irrigation District, suggesting that the government had
breached its fiduciary duty to the tribe by neglecting the tribe’s fishing
rights.222 But the Supreme Court, in a five to four decision, reversed the

217 See Nevada v. United States, 463 U.S. 110, 116–19 (1983) (explaining that in 1924 a special
master recommended awarding the reservation 12,412 acre-feet annually of water for the tribe
to irrigate 3,130 acres of reservation lands; however, the government sought water to irrigate an
additional 2,745 acres, to which the irrigators agreed in a 1935 settlement, which the district
court adopted as the Orr Ditch Decree in 1944); see also ROYSTER & BLUMM, supra note 50, at
446–47.
218 Pyramid Lake Paiute Tribe, 354 F. Supp. at 254, 257.
219 Id. at 257.
220 Id. at 256.
221 See Nevada, 463 U.S. at 119 (quoting the government’s claim of a water right for “the
maintenance of the lower reaches of the Truckee River as a natural spawning ground for fish”).
222 See Truckee-Carson Irrigation Dist., 649 F.2d 1286, 1308 (9th Cir. 1981) (“The
government’s representation of the Tribe’s interests in Orr Ditch was analogous to that of a
faithless fiduciary who was nevertheless authorized to represent its beneficiary.”); id. at 1310
(“By representing the Tribe and the Project against the Orr Ditch defendants, the government
compromised its duty of undivided loyalty to the Tribe.”). The Ninth Circuit reversed only as to
the Truckee-Carson Irrigation District, not other irrigators, since the federal government
represented both the district and the tribe in the Orr Ditch proceedings, meaning their was no
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Ninth Circuit, concluding that there was no breach because Congress had,
by assuming trusteeship for the tribe while authorizing the Newlands Project
which damaged the tribe, required the secretary “to carry water on at least
two shoulders.”223 As a result, the Court ruled that the federal government
“cannot follow the fastidious standards of a private fiduciary,” and thus the
secretary did not breach his duties when he failed to protect the tribal
fisheries in the Orr Ditch Decree.224 The Court gave no attention to the fact
that the Orr Ditch Decree never expressed any intention to terminate the
tribe’s fishing culture or the fact that for centuries tribal members had been
fishermen.225 A respected Indian law scholar concluded that the best
explanation for the decision was Chief Justice Rehnquist’s campaign against
Indian tribal autonomy.226

B. The Situation Today
The Supreme Court’s decision in Nevada v. United States foreclosed the
Pyramid Lake Paiute Tribe from using its reserved rights for the protection
of its historical fisheries—a bitter irony, given that the water decreed to the
tribe in the 1944 Orr Ditch Decree was based on the supposedly agricultural
purpose of the Pyramid Lake Reservation, notwithstanding the fact that
tribal members had for centuries been fishermen.227 Despite this apparently
crushing setback, over the past twenty years the tribe has successfully used
Nevada state water law, water quality litigation, and pressure based on the
ESA status of the cui-ui and Lahontan cutthroat trout to secure additional
instream flows in the Truckee River and into Pyramid Lake.
The tribe has been an active participant in federal litigation and
settlements aimed at keeping water in the Truckee River and Pyramid Lake
to protect the cui-ui and Lahontan cutthroat trout and maintaining the river’s
water quality. In 1985, the federal district court in Nevada obtained
jurisdiction over the 1972 District of Columbia district court decree in
Pyramid Lake Paiute Tribe v. Morton,228 and then ordered the Department of
adversity between them, and therefore the court felt that res judicata was inapplicable. See id.
at 1309 (“[T]he rules of res judicata are based upon an adversary system of procedure which
exists for the purpose of giving an opportunity to persons to litigate claims against each
other.”).
223 Nevada, 463 U.S. at 128.
224
225

Id.
See Brendan Smith, Lower Truckee River Restoration (Apr. 2005), http://www.redlodge

clearinghouse.org/stories/truckeeriver.html (last visited Nov. 12, 2006) [hereinafter Lower
Truckee River Restoration] (providing a history of the Truckee River and competing interests’
attempts to solve its environmental challenges); Telephone Interview by David Becker with
John Jackson, Dir., Water Res., Pyramid Lake Paiute Tribe, in Nixon, Nev. (Mar. 16, 2006)
[hereinafter Interview with John Jackson].
226 Ralph W. Johnson, Chief Justice Rehnquist and the Indian Cases, 16 PUB. LAND L. REV. 1,
7, 10 (1995).
227 See Lower Truckee River Restoration, supra note 225; Interview with John Jackson,
supra note 225.
228 See Pyramid Lake Paiute Tribe of Indians v. Hodel, 882 F.2d 364, 367 (9th Cir. 1989)
(discussing the history of the case).
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the Interior to adopt operating criteria and procedures for the Truckee River
to cause surplus water from the Stampede Reservoir to flow down the
Truckee into Pyramid Lake.229 The changed operations produced more
litigation, and the Ninth Circuit eventually upheld the Department’s
authority to manage Stampede Reservoir to provide instream flows in
1989.230
In an effort to resolve some of the long-standing disputes over Truckee
River water rights, including the tribe’s claims, Congress passed the
Truckee-Carson-Pyramid Lake Water Rights Settlement Act in 1990.231 The
Settlement Act required the Secretary of the Interior to negotiate an
operating agreement for the Truckee River and Newlands Reclamation
Project that would enhance flows in the Truckee River for the Pyramid Lake
fishery to help meet the requirements of the ESA, including a recovery plan
for the cui-ui.232 The Act also established an economic development fund of
$40 million for the tribe as well as a separate $25 million fund for the
recovery of the lake’s fisheries.233 Six years later, in October 1996, the tribe
agreed to drop the Clean Water Act lawsuits it had brought in 1988—thus
conceding to changes in the operation of the Reno/Sparks wastewater
treatment plant—as part of the 1996 Truckee River Water Quality
Agreement.234 In return, the two cities and the Department of the Interior
agreed to spend $24 million to purchase existing water rights on the Truckee
River from willing sellers and dedicate that water to instream flow approved
by the state engineer.235 By 2006, the federal government and the cities had
spent about $8 million of the settlement amount acquiring approximately
4,500 acre-feet of water rights for instream flows.236 The tribe now
administers the federal part of the program, which results in the creation of
instream rights under Nevada law, titled in the tribe’s name.237
229
230

See id. at 368, 370; see also supra notes 215–17 and accompanying text.
Id. at 367–70 (reversing a district court decision which ordered storage releases for

irrigation based on irrigator claims that they were entitled to a “water credit”).
231 Pub. L. 101-618, tit. II, 104 Stat. 3289 (1990); see also State of Nev., Div. of Water Res.,
Nevada Water Facts (1992), available at http://water.nv.gov/Water%20Planning/wat-fact/
issues.htm [hereinafter Nevada Water Facts]; Paul Wagner & Martin E. Lebo, Managing the
Resources of Pyramid Lake, Nevada, Amidst Competing Interests, 51 J. SOIL WATER CONSERV.
108, 113 (1996).
232 See Nevada Water Facts, supra note 231; Wagner & Lebo, supra note 231, at 113–14.
233 See Nevada Water Facts, supra note 231.
234 See Div. of Water Res., State of Nev. Dep’t of Conservation & Natural Res., Truckee River
Chronology Part III—Twentieth Century, http://water.nv.gov/Water%20planning/truckee/
truckee3.htm (last visited Nov. 12, 2006) (noting the initiation of lawsuits in Dec. 1988 and
subsequent resolution in Oct. 1996); John Jackson, Truckee River Water Quality Agreement, in
TRANSBOUNDARY WATERS: CROSSING CULTURAL BOUNDARIES FOR SUSTAINABLE SOLUTIONS 48
(Utton Transboundary Res. Ctr., 2005), available at http://uttoncenter.unm.edu/pdfs/Crossing_
Cultural_Boundaries.pdf.
235 Interview with John Jackson, supra note 225; see Jackson, supra note 234, at 48.
236 Jackson, supra note 234, at 48. Many of the rights purchased have 1902 priority dates
because they are original rights associated with the Newlands Reclamation Project. Id.
237 Id. Acquisition of additional rights has slowed because of a spike in the price of water
rights on the Truckee River. However, the tribe is exploring purchasing and retiring irrigation
rights along the Carson River. This would effectively increase flows in the Truckee River by
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The tribe has also successfully asserted its rights under Nevada water
law to obtain additional instream flows. In 1998, the Nevada state engineer
granted the tribe’s application, under Nevada state law, for the remaining
unappropriated water in the Truckee River.238 These new tribal water rights
are junior to existing rights and are subject to state law. In 1999, the Nevada
legislature amended state water law to protect owners of Truckee River and
other state surface water rights from forfeiture due to non-use, thus ensuring
that water rights used for instream flows would not be forfeited.239 Then, in
2001, the state engineer approved the tribe’s application for a temporary
transfer of nearly 25,000 acre-feet of its reserved irrigation water rights to
instream use to protect fish during a drought year.240 Although the right
transferred was a reserved tribal water right, so that the tribe arguably could
have sought the change of use in federal court, it decided instead to use the
state transfer procedures.241 According to the tribe’s water resources
director, this process of establishing tribal instream rights under state law
has encouraged the tribe and upstream water users to view themselves as
partners in restoring the Truckee River.242
Thus, through a multi-faceted approach including litigation, settlement,
and use of the state water rights process, the Pyramid Lake Pauite Tribe has
been able to restore some instream flows to the Truckee River despite the
1983 Supreme Court decision that denied its attempt to use the reserved
rights doctrine to restore its fisheries. The ensuing use of settlement and
state law to produce tribal instream flows has begun to transform the lower
Truckee and may perhaps eventually do the same for Pyramid Lake itself.243

reducing the amount required to be diverted out of the Truckee and into the Carson under the
Interior Department’s operating criteria and procedures adopted in the wake of the 1972 federal
district court decision in Pyramid Lake Paiute Tribe v. Morton. Id.
238 See Turnipseed v. Truckee-Carson Irrigation Dist., 13 P.3d 395, 396–97 (Nev. 2000) (noting
that the state engineer granted the tribe’s application to appropriate previously unappropriated
waters of the Truckee River on Nov. 24, 1998); see also NEV. DIV. OF WATER PLANNING, NEVADA
STATE WATER PLAN 2-12 (1974), available at http://water.nv.gov/water%20planning/wat-plan/pt1sec2.pdf (“[T]he Pyramid Lake Paiute Tribe has secured a right to the unapprorpriated water in
the Truckee River in accordance with Nevada water law.”).
239 See NEV. REV. STAT. § 533.060(2) (2005) (“Rights to the use of surface water shall not be
deemed to be lost or otherwise forfeited for the failure to use the water therefrom for a
beneficial purpose.”).
240 See United States v. Truckee-Carson Irrigation Dist., 429 F.3d 902, 904–05, 907–09 (9th
Cir. 2005) (upholding the district court’s decision to allow the tribe to transfer the total amount
of water it had a right to use for irrigation to improve instream flow minus the amount that
would have been lost due to irrigation transport losses).
241 Interview with John Jackson, supra note 225.
242 See Jackson, supra note 234, at 48 (explaining that through the agreement, the tribe has
moved from seeing Truckee irrigators and other upstream water users as opponents to seeing
them as partners); see also Interview with John Jackson, supra note 225 (noting that the tribe
decided to request only a temporary transfer, thus allowing the use to revert back to irrigation
in future years, mindful that it might never be able to reverse a permanent transfer to instream
flow because of concerns for the ESA-listed fish).
243 Interview with John Jackson, supra note 225.
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VII. THE NEZ PERCE TRIBE AND THE SNAKE RIVER BASIN ADJUDICATION: SETTLING
TO AVOID A HOSTILE STATE JUDICIARY
The Snake River—the Columbia’s largest tributary—rises above
Jackson Lake, Wyoming and flows westerly through central Idaho, then
north along the Idaho-Oregon border, and eventually west through
southeastern Washington to its confluence with the Columbia River.244 For
several thousand years, the Nez Perce lived throughout the valleys and
canyons of the Snake River Basin in small, peaceful fishing villages.245
Historically, the Nez Perce fishery encompassed at least fifty different sites
in the Snake River Basin, each yielding between 300 and 700 adult salmon
per day.246
In 1855, the Nez Perce signed the first of two treaties with the United
States, relinquishing aboriginal title to some 5.5 million acres in southeastern
Washington and northeastern Oregon in return for a reservation of
approximately eight million acres and the exclusive right to harvest fish in
streams running through the reservation.247 Like the other Indian treaties
signed with Washington Governor Isaac Stevens,248 the Nez Perce Treaty
also reserved to the tribe the “right of taking fish at all usual and accustomed
places in common with citizens of the Territory.”249
Although the 1855 Treaty required the United States to defend the Nez
Perce reservation,250 the government failed to prevent homesteaders, miners,

244 In total, the Snake River spans 1,038 miles through Wyoming, Idaho, Oregon, and
Washington. See Wikipedia, Snake River, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Snake_River (last visited
Nov. 12, 2006).
245 FRANCES HAINES, THE NEZ PERCÉS, at xv (1955). The aboriginal territory of the Nez
Perce—or Nimi’ipuu—encompassed some 17 million acres in central Idaho, southeastern
Washington, and northeastern Oregon. Nez Perce Tribe Web Site, Frequently Asked Questions,
http://www.nezperce.org/History/FrequentlyAskedQ.htm (last visited Nov. 12, 2006).
Historically, the Nez Perce consisted of several separate bands, each with its own territory, and
each comprised of several fishing villages. Together, the various villages and bands comprised a
politically unified composite band. Although the Nez Perce were not technically a nomadic
people, they did travel seasonally throughout the Snake River Basin to hunt, fish, and gather
food. Id.
246 JOSEPH E. TAYLOR, III, MAKING SALMON: AN ENVIRONMENTAL HISTORY OF THE NORTHWEST
FISHERIES CRISIS 20 (1999). For a detailed examination of the Nez Perce litigation and the
subsequent Snake River Basin Adjudication Agreement, see generally Alexander Hays V (Ti),
The Nez Perce Water Rights Settlement and the Revolution in Indian Country, 36 ENVTL. L. 869
(2006).
247 Treaty with the Nez Perces, art. III, June 11, 1855, 12 Stat. 957 (1863); see ALVIN M.
JOSEPHY, JR., THE NEZ PERCE INDIANS AND THE OPENING OF THE NORTHWEST 334–45 (1965)
(discussing the terms of the treaty).
248 See Treaty with the Nez Perces, supra note 247, at art. III; Treaty with the Walla-Wallas
art. I, June 9, 1855, 12 Stat. 945 (1863); Treaty with the Yakamas art. III, June 9, 1855, 12 Stat. 951
(1863).
249 Treaty with the Nez Perces, supra note 247, at art. III. The United States also agreed to
pay the Nez Perce two hundred thousand dollars in a series of payments. Id. art. IV.
250 See id. art. II (establishing the Nez Perce reservation for the “exclusive use and benefit”
of the Tribe and expressly prohibiting any “white man, excepting those in the employment of
the Indian department [from residing upon the reservation] without permission of the tribe”);
see also Hays, supra note 246, at 876–77 (discussing the terms of the 1855 treaty).
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and grazers from trespassing and settling on reservation lands.251 Instead,
the United States attempted to quell growing tensions between settlers and
the Nez Perce by reinitiating treaty negotiations with the tribe, persuading
the Nez Perce to cede most of its remaining tribal lands.252 Consequently, in
1863, the Nez Perce ceded approximately ninety percent of the lands the
tribe reserved in the treaty just eight years earlier, retaining only a 750,000acre reservation east of Lewiston, Idaho.253 The tribe also expressly retained
its 1855 treaty rights to both on and off-reservation fishing rights.254 Despite
the long history of judicial interpretation of such treaties on terms favorable
to the Indians,255 however, the Nez Perce have not fared well in either
federal or state courts when asserting water rights necessary for the
preservation and protection of the tribe’s treaty right to fish.

A. The Nez Perce Tribe Meets a Hostile Judiciary
In Nez Perce Tribes v. Idaho Power Company,256 for example, the
federal District Court of Idaho denied the tribe compensation for the damage
done to its salmon fisheries by Idaho Power Company’s (IPC) construction
and operation of the Hell’s Canyon dams on the middle Snake River.257
Under the Federal Power Act (FPA), each federal dam licensee is liable for
all damages to the “property” of others caused by the construction,
maintenance, or operation of its projects.258 The Nez Perce alleged that IPC’s
251 See HAINES, supra note 245, at 142–44 (describing mass trespasses by settlers on Nez
Perce lands).
252 Id. at 144–147; see Hays, supra note 246, at 877 (describing events leading to the second
treaty).
253 Treaty with the Nez Perces, June 9, 1863, 14 Stat. 647 (1863). Historians and
commentators claim that the United States obtained the Treaty of 1863 without the consent of
several Nez Perce bands and villages, many of whom were forced to leave their ancestral homes
as a result of the Treaty of 1863. See HAINES, supra note 245, at 145–47.
254 See Treaty with the Nez Perces, supra note 253, at art. VIII (providing that “all the
privileges of said treaty [referring to the Treaty of 1855] which are not abrogated or specifically
changed by any article herein contained, shall remain the same to all intents and purposes as
formerly . . . to the Indians outside of the reservation”).
255 See Adair II, 723 F.2d 1394, 1408 n.13 (9th Cir. 1983) (“[T]he purposes of Indian
reservations are necessarily entitled to broader interpretation if the goal of Indian selfsufficiency is to be attained.”); United States v. Winans, 198 U.S. 371, 380 (1905) (construing the
Stevens’ treaties as “unlettered people” would have understood them and as “justice and reason
demand”).
256 847 F. Supp. 791 (D. Idaho 1994).
257 Id. at 808. The Hell’s Canyon Complex—three privately owned hydroelectric dams and
reservoirs, all owned by Idaho Power Company—is the largest non-federal hydroelectric facility
in the Pacific Northwest. U.S. Forest Serv., Hells Canyon Complex-Relicensing,
http://www.fs.fed.us/r6/w-w/planning/relicensing/index.htm (last visited Nov. 12, 2006). The
complex consists of Brownlee Dam and reservoir, a large storage dam; Oxbow Dam; and Hell’s
Canyon Dam, which is the lowest of the dams on the river and the uppermost reach of salmon
migration today. Blumm & Swift, supra note 149, at 482 n.373.
258 16 U.S.C. §§ 792–825 (2000). Under the Federal Power Act, licensees are liable “for all
damages occasioned to the property of others by the construction, maintenance, or operation of
the project works or of the works appurtenant or accessory thereto, constructed under the
license.” Id. § 803(c).
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Hell’s Canyon dams, which permanently blocked salmon access to nearly
eighty percent of the historical spawning grounds in the upper Snake River
and decimated salmon populations in the Snake River Basin,259 entitled the
tribe to damages under the FPA as well as under federal common law.260
Despite judicial precedent recognizing that the Stevens treaties not only
created tribal property rights,261 but also reserved for the tribes a fair share
of harvestable salmon runs262 and water necessary to protect fishing
rights,263 the district court held that the Nez Perce had no property rights for
which compensation was due because the tribe did not own an absolute
right to the individual fish in any given salmon run.264 Instead, so the court
reasoned, the Nez Perce Treaty created only treaty rights—that is, the
treaties merely reserved to the tribes “an opportunity to catch fish if they are
present at the accustomed fishing grounds.”265 According to the court, the
Nez Perce treaty rights restricted the tribe’s compensation claims to those
against the government—not private parties like IPC.266 In so ruling, the
district court failed to recognize that the Indian treaty fishing right is in fact
a property right—a piscary profit à prendre 267—which burdens non-parties
to the agreement, including private parties and subsequently incorporated

259 NAT’L MARINE FISHERIES SERV., FACTORS FOR DECLINE: A SUPPLEMENT TO THE NOTICE OF
DETERMINATION FOR WEST COAST STEELHEAD UNDER THE ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT 6 (1996),
available at http://www.krisweb.com/biblio/gen_nmfs_nmfs_1996_stlhffd.pdf. In 1996, the
National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS) estimated Columbia River Basin anadromous fish
stocks at 10 million below historical levels. The agency attributed approximately 80% of this
decline to hydropower development on the Columbia and Snake rivers. Id. In the late 1800s, the
number of spring/summer chinook salmon returning to the Snake River to spawn may have
exceeded 1.5 million. By 1994, this figure declined by over 99%, to 1,822 fish. NAT’L MARINE
FISHERIES SERV., PROPOSED RECOVERY PLAN FOR SNAKE RIVER SALMON II-9, 13 (1995). In 1990,
only 78 wild Snake River chinook salmon returned to the Hell’s Canyon reach of the Snake
River. Id. In the late 1980s and early 1990s, Snake River sockeye salmon—eliminated from
nearly all areas of their historical Snake River Basin habitat—returned to the Snake River in
single-digit numbers annually. Id. at II-10, 13–14.
260 Nez Perce Tribe, 847 F. Supp. at 795.
261 See United States v. Winans, 198 U.S. 371, 381 (1905) (determining that treaty fishing
rights burden private property with servitudes of access to usual and accustomed fishing sites;
the U.S. Supreme Court characterized this right as a “right in the land”); Menominee Tribe of
Indians v. United States, 391 U.S. 404, 413 (1968) (suggesting that, should the United States
commit a taking of a treaty hunting or fishing right, a claim for compensation would arise).
262 Fishing Vessel, 443 U.S. 658, 686–87 (1979).
263 Adair II, 723 F.2d 1394, 1410 (9th Cir. 1983).
264 Nez Perce Tribe, 847 F. Supp. at 808. For more on Idaho District Court’s ruling see
SACRIFICING THE SALMON, supra note 134, at 267–70.
265 Nez Perce Tribe, 847 F. Supp. at 795. The district court’s distinction between treaty rights
and property rights was inconsistent with Supreme Court precedent indicating that treaties
should be broadly interpreted as the “unlettered” Indian peoples would have understood them.
See, e.g., Winans, 198 U.S. at 380 (explaining that the Court “will construe a treaty with the
Indians as ‘that unlettered people’ understood it”); Fishing Vessel, 443 U.S. at 676 (“[T]he treaty
must therefore be construed, not according to the technical meaning of its words to learned
lawyers, but in the sense in which they would naturally be understood by the Indians.” (quoting
Jones v. Meehan, 175 U.S. 1, 11 (1899)).
266 Nez Perce Tribe, 847 F. Supp. at 811.
267 See SACRIFICING THE SALMON, supra note 134, at 270.
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states.268 Before the Ninth Circuit heard an appeal of this decision, IPC and
the tribe settled the case.269
Five years after the federal district court ruled that the Nez Perce
treaties implied no right to protect salmon habitat from damage caused by
private parties,270 the Nez Perce and the United States as trustee for the tribe
filed water rights claims in the Snake River Basin Adjudication (SRBA), a
McCarran Amendment proceeding involving all water claims in the Snake
River. From the special state court established to adjudicate the SRBA, the
tribe sought recognition of its claims to waters necessary to preserve the
tribe’s express treaty-reserved fishing rights.271 Like the implied reserved
rights recognized by the Supreme Court in United States v. Winans272 and the
Ninth Circuit in Adair II,273 the Nez Perce argued that the treaties implied a
federal right to streamflows necessary to preserve the tribe’s bargained-for
treaty right to fish in the Snake River Basin.274 Without such a right, the tribe
maintained, its treaty fishing rights would be virtually meaningless.
The SRBA court proceeded to ignore the precedents supporting the
tribe and the federal government275 and ruled that its reserved treaty right to
268 In Winans, for example, the Supreme Court concluded that the Indian treaty right was a
right in land—a servitude—which burdened private parties operating fish wheels on the
Columbia River, and attempting to exclude Indians from their historical fishing grounds. 198
U.S. at 381; see also Seufert Bros. v. United States, 249 U.S. 194, 198–99 (1919) (concluding that
the treaties entitled Indians to cross the Columbia River to access historical fishing grounds on
both sides of the river); Union Oil Co. v. Oppen, 501 F.2d 558, 568 (9th Cir. 1974) (allowing a
damages action brought by commercial fishers against oil companies that caused an oil spill);
Puget Sound Gillnetters Ass’n v. U.S. Dist. Court, 573 F.2d 1123, 1132–33 (9th Cir. 1978)
(concluding that a citizen’s right to take fish is “derivative of the state’s interest,” and thus
individual fishers were bound by the treaties); United States v. Washington, 135 F.3d 618, 635
(9th Cir. 1998) (concluding that Indian treaty rights to shellfish burdened private property
owners, and entitled the tribes to a fair share of the harvest and granted the tribes access to
historical shellfish beds across private lands). As long ago as 1809, English courts recognized
that the owner of a duck pond had a cause of action against someone who drove away the
ducks, and in so doing “hinder[ed] another in his trade or livelihood.” Keeble v. Hickeringill,
(1809) 103 Eng. Rep. 1127, 1128 (K.B.).
269 Under the settlement, IPC paid the tribe $11.5 million not to pursue an appeal. The utility
also offered $5 million for the tribe’s “full support” of IPC’s application to relicense its Hells
Canyon dams. See ROYSTER & BLUMM, supra note 50, at 550. The tribe subsequently decided
against offering its “full support” of IPC’s relicensing application.
270 See Nez Perce Tribe, 847 F. Supp. at 808.
271 In re SRBA, No. 39576, Subcase No. 03-10022 at 9 (Idaho Dist. Ct. Nov. 10, 1999);
SACRIFICING THE SALMON, supra note 134, at 264.
272 198 U.S. 371 (1905); see supra note 142 and accompanying text.
273 In Adair II, 723 F.2d 1394 (9th Cir. 1984), discussed supra notes 37–50 and accompanying
text, the Ninth Circuit observed that the Klamath Tribe intended to preserve a traditional fishing
lifestyle when it agreed to the 1864 treaty with the federal government, and that this purpose
necessarily implied instream water rights. Id. at 1414–15. The court concluded “at the forefront
of the Tribe’s concerns in negotiating the treaty” was “a continuation of its traditional hunting
and fishing lifestyle.” Id. at 1409. The fishing right was virtually meaningless without water. Id.
274 In re SRBA, No. 39576, Consolidated Subcase No. 03-10022 at 9; see Hays, supra note 246,
at 881 (discussing this case).
275 See Winans, 198 U.S. at 381 (“The right to resort to the fishing places in controversy was a
part of larger rights possessed by the Indians, upon the exercise of which there was not a
shadow of impediment, and which were not much less necessary to the existence of the Indians
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fish on ceded lands included no accompanying water right.276 Judge Barry
Wood277 determined that the Nez Perce treaty’s express reservation of the
right to continue to fish off-reservation did not evince sufficient intent to
reserve off-reservation water rights necessary to preserve that purpose.278
Central to the SRBA court’s decision was its conclusion that the tribe’s claim
to off-reservation water was inconsistent with the purpose of the Nez Perce
Treaty, which the court thought “was to resolve the conflict which arose
between the Indians and non-Indian settlers.”279 Although certainly the
federal government sought to ease tensions between the Nez Perce and
settlers by extinguishing aboriginal title and removing the tribe to a
reservation out of the onrushing path of settlement,280 the SRBA court failed
to seriously consider the tribal purpose of the Nez Perce treaties: the
preservation of its traditional fishing culture through express reservations of
fishing rights.281
than the atmosphere they breathed.”); Adair II, 723 F.2d at 1410 (concluding that without water,
the Klamath Tribe’s treaty right to hunt and fish on reservation lands would be virtually
meaningless); see also supra notes 35–50, 140 and accompanying text.
276 In re SRBA, No. 39576, Subcase No. 03-10022 at 38.
277 After Judge Wood rendered his SRBA opinion, the Nez Perce learned the judge was in
fact a Snake River Basin water right holder who had a pecuniary interest in the outcome of the
case, as did his family. SACRIFICING THE SALMON, supra note 134, at 265. Judge Wood had
groundwater claims for irrigation and domestic uses on thirteen acres; his brother and two
sisters also had water rights claims subject to the SRBA. Michael C. Blumm et al., Judicial
Termination of Treaty Water Rights: The Snake River Case, 36 IDAHO L. REV. 449, 475 (2000)
[hereinafter The Snake River Case]. Judge Wood’s sister and brother-in-law were also members
of a partnership that had irrigation and domestic water rights claims in the SRBA. Id. Under the
Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, a judge may be disqualified for cause if the judge “is a party, or
is interested in the action or proceeding,” or because the judge “is related to either party by
consanguinity or affinity within the third degree . . . .” IDAHO R. CIV. P. 40(d)(2)(A)(1)–(2).
Despite Judge Wood’s potential conflicts, he rejected a Nez Perce motion to disqualify him,
ruling that any conflicts were “indirect, speculative and, at best de minimus.” The Snake River
Case, supra, at 476 (quoting In re SRBA, No. 39576, Subcase No. 03-10022). For a detailed
examination of Judge Wood’s role in the SRBA case see The Snake River Case, supra, at 475–77.
278 See ROYSTER & BLUMM, supra note 50, at 415.
279 In re SRBA, No. 39576, Subcase No. 03-10022 at 38. The SRBA court concluded that it was
“inconceivable that either the United States or the Tribe intended or even contemplated that the
Tribe would remain in control of the water.” Id.
280 Nez Perce Tribe, 847 F. Supp. 791, 806 (D.Idaho 1994); The Snake River Case, supra note
277, at 458; Hays, supra note 246, at 882–83.
281 See The Snake River Case, supra note 277, at 458–60 (examining the SRBA court’s onesided interpretation of the Nez Perce treaties, and concluding that the court opinion resembled
an “advocate’s brief more than a dispassionate judicial opinion[]”). Despite the U.S. Supreme
Court’s observation that a salmon fishery is “not much less necessary to the [Tribe’s]
existence . . . than the atmosphere they breathed,” the SRBA court concluded that it would be
repugnant to the purpose of the treaty negotiations to find that the tribes or the United States
intended to reserve off-reservation streamflows for the benefit of the fishery. See Fishing
Vessel, 443 U.S. 658, 650 (1979) (quoting Winans, 198 U.S. 371, 381 (1905)); In re SRBA, No.
39576, Subcase No. 03-10022 at 38 (distinguishing Fishing Vessel because the Nez Perce treaty
aimed to resolve a conflict between tribal members and non-Indians settlers who had obtained
federal patents under the provisions of the Oregon Donation Act of 1850, and concluding that
“[i]t is inconceivable that the United States would have intended or otherwise agreed to allow
the Nez Perce to reserve instream flow off reservation water rights appurtenant to lands
intended to be developed and irrigated by non-Indian settlers.”) The Idaho court also described
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Echoing the earlier federal district court decision,282 the SRBA court
opined that “an implied water right [wa]s not necessary” because the Nez
Perce enjoyed no “absolute right to a predetermined or consistent level of
fish.”283 For this proposition, the court cited the Supreme Court’s decision in

Washington v. Washington State Commercial Passenger Fishing Vessel
Ass’n,284 in which the Court ruled that treaty language like that in the Nez
Perce treaty reserved up to one-half of salmon harvests to tribal fishers but
did not establish a minimum entitlement.285 The SRBA court managed to
overlook the Supreme Court’s central ruling—that the treaties established an
entitlement to the amount of harvestable salmon “necessary to provide the
Indians with a livelihood—that is to say, a moderate living.”286 If water is
necessary to provide the tribe a moderate fishing livelihood, it is hard to
understand why the tribe would not have reserved water to fulfill that
purpose.

the Nez Perce’s instream claim as an attempt to remedy an “unforeseen consequence which it
now believes threatens its fishing right.” Id. at 39. The court noted that, historically many
activities have threatened the fishing rights, including blocked access to fishing grounds and
overharvest of fish by non-Indian fisherman, but erroneously claimed that these threats were
not protected by the treaty (overlooking Winans and Fishing Vessel), and thus the treaty offered
no protection against either the current scarcity of water issue or other future issues, as “only
so many interpretations can be exacted from the Treaty language.” Id.
282 Nez Perce Tribe, 847 F. Supp. at 819 (D. Idaho 1994); see supra notes 264–66 (discussing
the court’s reasoning and holding).
283 In re SRBA, No. 39576, Subcase No. 03-10022 at 33. According to the SRBA court, both the
state’s authority to regulate the treaty harvest right in the name of conservation as well as the
Idaho District Court’s earlier Nez Perce Tribe decision—holding that the tribe had no ownership
rights in any individual fish—supported its conclusion that the treaty right to fish was a limited
one. Id. at 34–37; see The Snake River Case, supra note 277, at 456 (discussing the SRBA Court’s
decision). In so doing, the SRBA court distinguished precedent recognizing implied water rights
to fulfill the fishing purposes of Indian treaties on the grounds that those cases involved either
on-reservation fishing rights or exclusive fishing rights—not merely rights to take fish “in
common” with the citizens of the state. In re SRBA, No. 39576, Subcase No. 03-10022 at 34–37.
Aside from its inaccurate characterization of precedent, see SACRIFICING THE SALMON, supra
note 134, at 268–71, the SRBA court’s distinction seems particularly unpersuasive in light of the
U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Winans, in which the Court rejected the argument that the
right to take fish “in common” simply put the Indians on “equal footing with the citizens of the
United States,” and interpreted the Yakama Tribe’s treaty to imply an Indian right of access to
historical fishing grounds on the Columbia River. Winans, 198 U.S. at 381.
The SRBA court also found significance in an 1893 agreement—later incorporated into a
statute—in which the Nez Perce agreed to a “present and total surrender of all tribal interests”
except as reserved by agreement. In re SRBA, No. 39576, Subcase No. 03-10022 at 44. The SRBA
court made no mention of Minnesota v. Mille Lacs Band of Chippewa Indians, 526 U.S. 172
(1999), in which the U.S. Supreme Court held that the Mille Lacs’ reserved off-reservation
hunting and fishing rights survived a similar agreement. See The Snake River Case, supra note
277, at 455–56 (discussing the SRBA court’s decision).
284 443 U.S. 658 (1979).
285 In re SRBA, No. 39576, Subcase No. 03-10022 at 33 (citing Fishing Vessel, 443 U.S. at 685–
86).
286 Fishing Vessel, 443 U.S. at 686; see also SACRIFICING THE SALMON, supra note 134, at 275–
76 (arguing the moderate living standard should guide federal and state agencies in planning
and approving projects that will affect salmon habitat).
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B. The Situation Today
Rather than appeal the 1999 SRBA court decision denying reserved
water rights for its off-reservation fishing rights,287 the Nez Perce and the
other parties entered into prolonged mediation in an attempt to settle the
case out of court. Over five years later, in March 2005, the tribe settled its
claims for on- and off-reservation water rights.288 The settlement resulted in
state recognition of tribal on-reservation water rights, which could be used
for instream flows, and the state agreed to acquire and administer instream
flow rights on rivers near the tribe’s reservation to improve salmon habitat.
The terms of the settlement call for the tribe to receive 50,000 acre-feet of
water for on-reservation uses consistent with the tribal water code.289
However, the tribe waived its claims to off-reservation instream flows based
on its treaty-reserved fishing rights.290
As part of the settlement, the state—the only entity allowed to hold
instream flow rights under Idaho water law291—promised to establish
instream flow rights at nearly 200 locations, selected by the tribe, in the
Salmon and Clearwater basins and also protect 600 springs on federal lands
ceded by the tribe.292 These instream flow rights will be subordinated to
water rights existing at the date of the settlement and also to future
domestic, commercial, industrial and municipal water rights, but they will
not be subordinated to future agricultural water use, except as to a small,

287 The tribe was clearly influenced by the Idaho Supreme Court’s surprising rejection of the
federal government’s reserved rights claims for wilderness areas within the state. Potlatch v.
United States, 12 P.3d 1260 (Idaho 2000) (reversing an earlier decision on a 3-2 vote). See
generally Michael C. Blumm, Reversing the Winters Doctrine?: Denying Reserved Water Rights
for Idaho Wilderness and Its Implications, 73 U. COLO. L. REV. 173 (2002) (discussing the
implications of the Idaho Supreme Court’s decisions on the future of the federal reserved water
rights doctrine, the prospects for streamflows in Idaho, and the Nez Perce tribe’s water claims).
288 See generally Hays, supra note 246, at 869 (describing history of Nez Perce reserved
water rights, efforts to secure acknowledgement of those rights through litigation, and the 2005
settlement agreement). For the Nez Perce Tribe’s perspective on the settlement, see K. Heidi
Gudgell, Steven C. Moore & Geoffrey Whiting, The Nez Perce Tribe’s Perspective on the
Settlement of Its Water Rights Claims in the Snake River Basin Adjudication, 42 IDAHO L. REV.
563 (2006).
289 Gudgell et al., supra note 288, at 590.
290 See id. at 572–73, 589–93 (discussing the tribe’s water right claims and provisions of the
final settlement agreement).
291 See IDAHO CODE ANN. § 42-1503 (2005) (“Whenever the [Idaho water resource] board
desires to appropriate a minimum stream flow . . . it shall submit an application to the director
[of the Idaho department of water resources]”); id. § 42-1504 (“Any person . . . may, in writing,
request that the board consider the appropriation of a minimum streamflow of the
unappropriated waters of any stream.”); see also GILLILAN & BROWN, supra note 207, at 121
(stating that Idaho “[s]tate statutes allow ‘the public’ to petition the Board to apply for instream
flow rights, but the Board has interpreted this language to mean that it may accept petitions
only from state agencies.”).
292 Hays, supra note 246, at 890. In addition, the federal government promised the tribe over
11,000 acres of on-reservation land and some $96 million in three separate funds for tribal
drinking water and sewer projects, water development projects, and cultural preservation and
fishery habitat restoration projects. See NATIVE AM. RIGHTS FUND, ANNUAL REPORT 2005 16
(2005), available at http://www.narf.org/pubs/ar/NARF2005.pdf [hereinafter NARF Report].
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varying percentage of use based on land ownership in each subbasin.293 The
state may change the use of these instream flow rights only after
consultation with the tribe.294 Despite the consultation requirement, the state
retains ultimate authority to change uses.295 The state must also identify
other flow-limited streams, take measures to augment instream flows, and
undertake other habitat improvement projects,296 although these
commitments are quite vague.
The Nez Perce decision to settle its reserved water right claims has
yielded a promise of enhanced instream flows outside its reservation
through the instream flow rights contained in the SRBA Agreement and
through the congressional funding provided in the SRBA Agreement to the
tribe and state in separate accounts. The tribe is likely to prioritize use of
these funds based on biological and cultural importance, and the state is
likely to prioritize these funds based on ESA exposure. It remains to be seen
whether the 2005 SRBA settlement will enable the tribe to successfully
transform its treaty fishing and water rights into sustainable and meaningful
instream flows that can help restore its damaged fishing culture. 297
VIII. CONCLUSION
The six cases examined in this study reveal that Justice Stevens’s
misgivings about states’ ability to provide a neutral forum for adjudicating
tribal reserved water rights were well justified.298 No tribe among the six
studied here was able to improve streamflows substantially through
successful litigation of its reserved water rights. In the McCarran
Amendment Era—where elected state court judges have the authority to
decide the scope of Indian reserved water rights—perhaps these results are
not surprising.299
293

Hays, supra note 246, at 890.
Id.
295 Id. at 898.
296 See id. at 891–93 (describing terms of settlement).
297 According to the tribe’s legal representative, the Native American Rights Fund, the
settlement
294

represents the merging of traditional Indian water rights settlement elements with other
major environmental issues confronting all of the people of Idaho. It could well be
looked at by other states and tribes and federal land management agencies in the west
seeking to sort out Indian water claims and other challenges presented by the federal
Endangered Species Act and the Clean Water Act.
NARF Report, supra note 292, at 17.
298 See Arizona v. San Carlos Apache Tribe, 463 U.S. 545, 575 (acknowledging that “[s]tates
and their citizens may well be more antagonistic toward Indian reserved rights than other
federal reserved rights, both because the former are potentially greater in quantity and because
they provide few direct or indirect benefits to non-Indian residents.”).
299 The litigation concerning Pyramid Lake was of course in federal, not state, court, a
reminder that the McCarran Amendment does not displace federal court jurisdiction unless the
state has undertaken a comprehensive basinwide adjudication meeting McCarran Amendment
standards. See, e.g., Thomas H. Pacheco, How Big Is Big? The Scope of Water Rights Suits
Under the McCarran Amendment, 15 ECOLOGY L.Q. 627, 669 (1988) (stating that the McCarran
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The Klamath Tribes are perhaps the best example of the mirage: over
thirty years after initiating federal court litigation, the tribes—despite
consistent success on the merits of their claims—have yet to see any
improvements in streamflows essential to their treaty fishing rights, as the
glacial movement of Oregon quantification inches forward.300 The tribes of
the Wind River Reservation, despite winning a considerable reserved right
for agriculture in the Big Horn Adjudication, were frustrated in their attempt
to transfer that ownership right to their preferred instream use by the
Wyoming Supreme Court.301 The Yakama Nation saw its attempt to protect
its treaty fishing rights with reserved water rights largely rejected by the
Washington Supreme Court, which invented out of whole cloth the concept
of “diminished” reserved rights.302
Settlements loomed large for the Gila River Indian Community, the
Pyramid Lake Paiute Tribe, and the Nez Perce Tribe. The Gila River Indian
Community used state court recognition of its reserved irrigation rights to
convince Congress to produce a statute that recognized the tribe’s water
rights and supplies the means to effectively use them.303 Whether this will
improve Gila River streamflows is uncertain, but the tribe does have the
apparent authority to produce increased streamflows on-reservation.304 The
Pyramid Lake Paiute Tribe perhaps produced the blueprint for the future:
despite Supreme Court denial of its attempt to use its reserved rights to
restore its fishery, the tribe has over the last two decades substantially
improved flows in the Truckee River, and in the process managed to
effectively use state law and procedures.305 This result is due, in large part,
because Nevada law allows parties other than the state to hold instream
flow rights.306 The Nez Perce Tribe—frustrated by hostile federal and state

Amendment “enabled nonfederal water users to obtain a judicial determination of the sizeable
federal water interests in the Western states. As interpreted by the courts, that consent to suit
contained the important qualification that consent was given only when such suits determine all
of the water rights of all of the water users in the entire stream system.”). For some of the
problems inherent in elected state court judges determining the scope and nature of federal
rights, see Gregory J. Hobbs, Jr., State Water Politics Versus an Independent Judiciary: The
Colorado and Idaho Experiences, 5 U. DENV. WATER L. REV. 122, 123 (2001) (explaining that two
state judges lost reelections largely because of decisions they authored which held that federal
water rights superseded state water rights).
300 See supra notes 78–85 and accompanying text (explaining that the Oregon Water
Resources Department (OWRD) is still in the process of resolving Klamath water rights over a
quarter century after the court in Adair I recognized the Klamath Tribes’ reserved instream flow
rights).
301 See supra notes 115–21 and accompanying text (discussing the Wyoming Supreme
Court’s decision).
302 See supra notes 146–51 and accompanying text (explaining the Washington Supreme
Court’s interpretation of diminished treaty rights).
303 See supra notes 198–204 and accompanying text (reviewing the Arizona Water
Settlements Act).
304 See supra note 203 and accompanying text (explaining that the tribe may use a portion of
its irrigation water for instream flows).
305 See supra notes 227–43 and accompanying text (discussing developments concerning
Truckee River flows).
306 See supra note 237 and accompanying text (explaining that tribes administer the federal
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court decisions to both its reserved rights claims and apparent precedent—
decided to settle for substantially less water and control than it claimed,
including allowing the state to determine the existence and scope of
instream rights essential to the tribe’s treaty fishing rights.307
Although the McCarran Era has made tribal reserved water rights
claims largely a mirage in terms of producing improved western
streamflows, tribal reserved rights are not insignificant. As the Pyramid Lake
Pauite Tribe and the Yakama Nation have shown, dexterous use of judicial
recognition of their reserved rights can enable tribes to bargain to transform
those federal rights into state-recognized rights capable of implementation
by established state water regimes.308 This seems to be the future for tribes
like those of the Klamath Reservation, which have yet to transform their
federally recognized reserved water rights into state-recognized rights that
the state will protect.
This reality will no doubt disappoint those who viewed resolution of
reserved water rights claims as a means to revolutionize western water
flows. But given the historic and recent hostility of both the federal and state
judiciary to tribal water rights,309 perhaps the best that tribes can do—given
the mirage of the McCarran Amendment Era—is to attempt to transform the
mirage into meaningful—albeit diminished—streamflow protection that
states and state courts, equipped with the immense authority the McCarran
Amendment supplies them,310 will accept.

part of the Truckee River and Newlands Reclamation Project, which results in instream rights
under Nevada law). Only Nevada, Arizona, and Alaska among western states allows entities
other than the state to hold instream rights. See Jack Sterne, Instream Rights & Invisible Hands:
Prospects for Private Instream Water Rights in the Northwest, 27 ENVTL. L. 203, 206–07 n.28
(1997) (explaining that instream rights in Arizona and Nevada rest on judicial interpretation).
307 See supra notes 287–97 and accompanying text (discussing the Nez Perce settlement).
308 See supra notes 228–43 (Pyramid Lake Tribe), 152–73 (Yakama Nation) and
accompanying text (discussing the tribes’ recent legislative, administrative, and judicial
successes).
309 See, e.g., supra notes 68–73 and accompanying text, discussing United States v. Braren,
338 F.3d 971, 974 (9th Cir. 2003) (vacating a federal district court decision, ruling that Klamath
Tribes’ treaty reserved rights to hunt, fish and gather on reservation lands implied a reserved
water right sufficient to support a “productive habitat,” for lack of ripeness due to the pendency
of state McCarran Amendment proceedings); and notes 270–85 and accompanying text,
discussing In Re SRBA, No. 39576, Subcase No. 03-10022 (Idaho Dist. Ct. Nov. 10, 1999)
(rejecting the Nez Perce claim of reserved water to support its off-reservation fishing rights).
310 The McCarran Amendment has been called “the Magna Carta of state water rights
adjudication,” John E. Thorson et al., Dividing the Waters: A Century of Adjudicating Rivers and
Streams, 8 U. DENV. WATER L. REV. 355, 359 (2005) (quoting A. Dan Tarlock, The Illusion of
Finality in General Water Rights Adjudication, 25 IDAHO L. REV. 271, 272 (1988–1989)). For an
argument that the Supreme Court should reexamine its McCarran Amendment decisions and
insist on an “unequivocal expression” of congressional intent in order to waive federal
sovereign immunity, see Stephen M. Feldman, The Supreme Court’s New Sovereign Immunity

Doctrine and the McCarran Amendment: Toward Ending State Adjudication of Indian Water
Rights, 18 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 433, 460 (1994).

